DIGITAL BAILMENTS
Michael J. O’Connor*
ABSTRACT
We send e-mails using Google’s Gmail, access the Internet through Verizon’s towers, and host our private files on
Dropbox’s drives. Against this backdrop, the Fourth Amendment faces a digital paradox: because a user’s
“reasonable expectation of privacy” defines its protections, users have no privacy. Users cannot expect privacy
when they voluntarily disclose documents to third parties. If we base our privacy from the Government on our
privacy from tech companies, then we are left with none at all.
This Article advocates a different approach. For almost a decade, the Supreme Court has suggested that property
rights provide an alternate path to Fourth Amendment protections. But neither jurists nor scholars have yet tried
to apply this doctrine to digital papers. This Article suggests three guiding principles. First, constitutional property
protections depend on underlying state property rights. Though the constitutional protections remain the same, the
underlying ownership rights shift as we adopt and discard new property law. Second, and surprisingly, the Court
has never defined when a property right proves sufficiently house-, paper-, or effect-like to create a constitutional
interest. But common law materials, caselaw, and scholarship all indicate that the right to exclude others makes
something your property. Third, modern laws like the Stored Communications Act grant information sources the
right to prevent recipients from propagating that information. This exclusion right triggers constitutional property
protections.
With this new foundation for a property-focused digital Fourth Amendment, hopefully we can reclaim in some
small measure what Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis called “the right to be let alone.”1
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INTRODUCTION
Recently in the Harvard Law Review, Professor Susan Freiwald and retired
Magistrate Judge Stephen William Smith criticized the Supreme Court for
its slow reaction to developing technology.2 As the authors point out, in just
one year, police sought cellular tracking information more than 120,000
times.3 Given that law enforcement often requests information for multiple
phones, they estimate that the government may have illegally obtained four
million reports since 2001. This staggering intrusion on citizens’ private lives
would horrify the Founders.
While many Americans have accepted living their lives on Facebook,
Twitter, Instagram, and whatever new social media platform finds purchase,
it seems unlikely that Americans have fully absorbed the implications.
Pervasive digital surveillance means the Government knows when we visit a
therapist and when we visit a drug store. It means the Government knows
what books we download to our Kindles and what movies we watch on
Netflix.
The Constitution poses no obstacle to Government’s all-seeing eye.
Under current Fourth Amendment doctrine, defined by Justice Harlan in
Katz v. United States, we retain constitutional rights only for those things that
we can reasonably expect will remain private.4 And we cannot reasonably
expect that our data will remain private when held by third parties.5 In a
world where Verizon compiles our cell phone records, Google scans our email, and Amazon maintains our reading lists, what data is not held by third
parties?
The Court has recently tried to build substantive limits into the thirdparty doctrine,6 but the extent and effectiveness of those limits will remain

2
3
4

5

6

See Susan Freiwald & Stephen Wm. Smith, The Carpenter Chronicle: A Near-Perfect Surveillance, 132
HARV. L. REV. 205, 231–35 (2018).
See id., at 232 (citing Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. in Support of
Petitioner at 13–14, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402)).
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My understanding of
the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation
be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“This Court consistently has held that a
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third
parties.”).
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (“[W]hen Smith was decided in 1979,
few could have imagined a society in which a phone goes wherever its owner goes, conveying to the
wireless carrier not just dialed digits, but a detailed and comprehensive record of the person’s
movements. We decline to extend Smith and Miller to cover these novel circumstances.”).
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unclear for many years. Often by the time the Court addresses an issue, the
world has moved on. Before cell phones, pagers were used by tens of millions
of Americans.7 Perhaps due to their frequent use by drug dealers,8 the lower
courts often resolved disputes over pager searches.9 Yet the Supreme Court
first addressed pager searches in 2010,10 nearly a decade after the New York
Times noted declining usage numbers11 and more than three years after Steve
Jobs took the stage to announce the iPhone.12
But we cannot fault the Court, at least not the current Court. Rather,
Katz itself creates the problem. Under Katz, constitutional standards depend
on “reasonable expectations of privacy.” But how can the Court determine
those expectations before technology matures and society’s relationship with
it stabilizes?13 Even more disturbing: What if law enforcement never permits
a privacy culture to develop around a new technology? With interminable
intrusions and relentless records requests, can law enforcement prevent a
stable societal expectation that online lives will remain private?14 Privacy law
necessarily entails uncertainty.
By contrast, property law provides certainty by design. Law students
struggling with the fee tail, the remainderman, and the contingent
7

8

9

10
11
12

13

14

See Jeffrey Selingo, The Bell Is Tolling for the Beeper, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2002),
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/11/technology/the-bell-is-tolling-for-the-beeper.html
(discussing the rise and fall of the beeper).
See Jonathan M. Moses, Message Is Out on Beepers, WASH. POST (July 11, 1988),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/07/11/message-is-out-onbeepers/58840caa-523e-413b-9224-60ad94d7803f/ (“[F]ederal narcotics agents estimate that at
least 90 percent of drug dealers use [pagers].”).
See, e.g., United States v. Romero-Garcia, 991 F. Supp. 1223 (D. Or. 1997), aff’d on other grounds, 168
F.3d 502 (9th Cir. 1999) (analyzing the reasonableness of beeper searches); United States v. Reyes,
922 F. Supp. 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (conducting a similar analysis); United States v. Blas, No. 90CR-162, 1990 WL 265179 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 4, 1990) (conducting a similar analysis).
See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010) (deciding on the reasonableness of pager searches).
See Selingo, supra note 7 (noting that the number of pager users declined by eight million between
1998 and 2000).
See John Markoff, Apple Introduces Innovative Cellphone, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
10, 2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/10/technology/10apple.html
(discussing
Apple’s
introduction of the new cellphone).
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he Katz test rests
on the assumption that this hypothetical reasonable person has a well-developed and stable set of
privacy expectations. But technology can change those expectations. Dramatic technological
change may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in flux . . . .”).
Cf. Zadeh v. Robinson, 902 F.3d 483, 499 (5th Cir. 2018) (Willett, J., concurring) (“[C]onstitutional
litigation increasingly involves cutting-edge technologies. If courts leapfrog the underlying
constitutional merits in cases raising novel issues like digital privacy, then constitutional
clarity . . . remains exasperatingly elusive. Result: blurred constitutional contours as technological
innovation outpaces legal adaptation.”). But see Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV.
101, 107 (2008) (suggesting that the Court understands the “logical trap” of considering police
officer conduct and avoided it by rooting their analysis in broader societal expectations).
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beneficiary can be forgiven their skepticism. But if we see a house, we need
not ask whether someone has an expectation of privacy in it, or whether
society would call that expectation reasonable. “If the property exists, then
property rights exist . . . .”15 Because the house is property, someone owns it.
It might belong to an individual or family, possibly a bank, or maybe the
state. But someone. As Professor James Stern puts it: “For each thing in
existence, the law of property tells us who is in charge and to what extent as
well as who has authority to decide how the thing will be used when disputes
over use arise.”16 By shifting the focus from privacy to property, the contours
of the right should stabilize earlier and more firmly than under Katz.
Nor should we worry that building up property law will tear down privacy
law. Property law enhances privacy.17 When I shut the door to my house, I
expect that criminal trespass law (and a stout deadbolt) will repel intruders.
Property law (and the intruder’s concern that I might have a shotgun) thereby
enhances my privacy. Revitalizing Fourth Amendment property precedent
can only serve our “right to be let alone.”18
But property law’s application to the Fourth Amendment and
particularly to digital technology requires defining digital property rights. In
Part I, this Article looks to how we determine property rights generally.
Specifically, what law applies? Common law as it existed at the Founding,
positive law that has developed since that time, or some combination? In
Part II, this Article considers which property rights engage the Fourth
Amendment’s protections. In Part III, it examines modern statutory schemes
and considers whether they trigger the property rights described in Part II.
In Part IV, it considers whether digital documents are Fourth Amendment
papers. In Part V, it considers the specific data types commonly created by
modern technology, like cloud files, e-mails, other messaging files, and
metadata.
I. EVER ANCIENT OR EVER NEW?
After decades with Katz’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” as the
principal test for the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has revitalized

15
16
17

18

James Y. Stern, Property’s Constitution, 101 CAL. L. REV. 277, 317 (2013).
Id. at 294.
See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 67, 94–95
(2012) (explaining the positive law model for the Fourth Amendment, where “the government
violates a reasonable expectation of privacy when it violates the suspect’s rights under some source
of nonconstitutional law such as property law”).
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1.
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property rights as another protection for private interests.19 In United States v.
Jones, the Supreme Court emphasized that this approach remained viable
and indeed never lapsed, but rather fell into disuse after Katz.20
The Supreme Court may have taken a twisty path to its current respect
for property rights. But those rights always had a deep relationship with the
Fourth Amendment. Indeed, countless Founding-era sources extol property
rights and decry their invasion.21 In Entick v. Carrington, one case that

19

20

21

The property-rights candle was never fully extinguished, even at Katz’s zenith. See, e.g., Soldal v.
Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 63 (1992) (“Respondents rely principally on precedents such as Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 . . . (1967), Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294 . . . (1967), and Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 . . . (1974), to demonstrate that the Fourth
Amendment is only marginally concerned with property rights. But the message of those cases is
that property rights are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations.”); United States v.
Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 729 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The owner
of property, of course, has a right to exclude from it all the world, including the Government, and
a concomitant right to use it exclusively for his own purposes. When the Government attaches an
electronic monitoring device to that property, it infringes that exclusionary right; in a fundamental
sense it has converted the property to its own use.”); see also United States v. James Daniel Good
Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 61 (1993) (“Individual freedom finds tangible expression in property
rights.”).
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406–07 (2012) (“[F]or most of our history the Fourth
Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the
areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) it enumerates. Katz did not repudiate that
understanding.”); see also Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S 1, 5 (2013) (“By reason of our decision in Katz
v. United States, property rights ‘are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations’—but
though Katz may add to the baseline, it does not subtract anything from the Amendment’s
protections ‘when the Government does engage in [a] physical intrusion of a constitutionally
protected area[.]’” (citations omitted)). Pre-Jones precedent provides some reason to doubt this
narrative, given that the Court repeatedly criticized crusty old property and tort law. See Silverman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (“Inherent Fourth Amendment rights are not inevitably
measurable in terms of ancient niceties of tort or real property law.”); Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257, 266 (1960) (“Distinctions such as those between ‘lessee,’ ‘licensee,’ ‘invitee’ and ‘guest,’
often only of gossamer strength, ought not to be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately
referable to constitutional safeguards.”); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 752 (1952) (“[I]t is
doubtful that the niceties of tort law initiated almost two and a half centuries ago by the case of the
Six Carpenters, 8 Coke 146 (a), cited by petitioner, are of much aid in determining rights under the
Fourth Amendment.”).
See, e.g., Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1066 (1765) (“The great end, for which men
entered into society, was to secure their property . . . . [E]very invasion of property, be it ever so
minute, is a trespass.”); THE FATHER OF CANDOR, A LETTER CONCERNING LIBELS, WARRANTS,
THE SEIZURE OF PAPERS, AND SECURITY FOR THE PEACE OR BEHAVIOR; WITH A VIEW TO SOME
LATE PROCEEDINGS, AND THE DEFENCE OF THEM BY THE MAJORITY 58 (3d ed. 1765)
(“Without these limitations [abrogating general warrants], there is no liberty or free enjoyment of
person or property, but every part of a man’s most valuable possessions and privacies, is liable to
the ravage, inroad, and inspection of suspicious ministers . . . .”); see also William Baude & James Y.
Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1838 (2016) (“When
we look at the nature of the harm or intrusion [in Entick and Wilkes], the first-step question, each
event stresses property.”); see generally Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1181 (2016) (discussing Founding-era sources throughout).
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motivated the Fourth Amendment, Lord Camden called property a principal
purpose for human civilization: “The great end, for which men entered into
society, was to secure their property.”22 William Penn considered ownership
and undisturbed possession essential English rights, saying “that which they
have is rightly theirs, and nobody’s else.”23 Colonial Diplomat and Virginia
delegate to the Continental Congress Arthur Lee called property rights “the
guardian of every other right,” saying that “to deprive a people of this, is in
fact to deprive them of their liberty.”24
In protecting “persons, houses, papers, and effects,” the Framers were
protecting property.25 Indeed, it appears that the Framers eschewed the
word “property” precisely because it was too narrow, connoting only personal
property, while the Framers wanted to include both personal and commercial
property.26
But while respect for property rights runs deep in Western history, the
theory establishing the moral and philosophical underpinning for those rights
stands famously divided.27 John Locke would say that property arises when
labor improves something provided by God, as when felling trees to make a
22
23
24

25

26

27

Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1066.
JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 294 (1996).
JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 32 (3d ed. 2008) (“The framers of the Pennsylvania constitution attached
a high priority to property rights, viewing private property as fully consistent with the type of
democratic society they wished to foster”).
See, e.g., Jones, 565 U.S. at 405 (“The text of the Fourth Amendment reflects its close connection to
property . . . .]”); Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1066 (“Papers are the owner’s goods and chattels: they
are his dearest property; and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an
inspection . . . .”); Michael C. Pollack, Taking Data, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 77, 113 (2019) (“[T]he text
of the Fourth Amendment refers to types of property—‘houses, papers, and effects’—and thus
reflects the Amendment’s historically ‘close connection to property.’ The British common law at
the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted likewise expressed the concept of a search as one in
which an unconsented entry onto property occurred.”).
See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 708 (1999)
(“The term ‘effects’ may have carried a broader connotation insofar as it was commonly used to
denote commercial goods.”); Donohue, supra note 21, at 1301 (“The Committee changed
Madison’s language that protected ‘persons, houses, papers, and other property, to ‘persons, houses,
papers, and effects.’ In making this alteration, the Committee extended the meaning beyond
personal property or possessions (as implied in ‘other property’) to include commercial items and
goods.”). Perhaps inadvertently, the Framers’ choice may have likewise narrowed the Amendment.
In Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), the Supreme Court explains that the term “effects”
was not understood to include real property, and thus does not include open fields. See id. at 176–
77.
See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 531
(2005) (“Notwithstanding its importance, property law has eluded both a consistent definition and
a unified conceptual framework. Indeed, modern property scholarship has utterly splintered the
field.”).
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house.28 The Hegelian would say that property has acquired some uniquely
personal value, like a home or wedding ring.29 The utilitarian would say that
property rights incentivize development and best allocate finite resources.30
And these systems are not alone, nor are they mutually exclusive; for
example, our intellectual property system builds on both Lockeian respect
for labor and utilitarian incentives.31
Thus arrives our first significant question: How do we determine which
property rights to recognize? Do we acknowledge only those property rights
recognized when the Constitution was ratified? Do we acknowledge only
property rights recognized by state law now? Must we find some middle
ground?
This question touches on a deep and unresolved question at property
law’s heart: Does property exist only because the legislature says it does, or
does it come from somewhere else? As Professor Robert Brauneis explains,
under the former positive law model, “property is defined in terms of the
advantages—the rights, powers, and immunities—afforded owners under
existing positive law.”32 Property rights are a drifting target, forever blown
this way and that by legislative whim. Meanwhile, under the latter natural

28

29

30

31

32

See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT 209 (1821),
https://books.google.com/books?id=K5UIAAAAQAAJ (“Though the earth, and all inferior
creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this no body has
any right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly
his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath
mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.”).
See Michael A. Carrier & Greg Lastowka, Against Cyberproperty, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1485, 1494
(2007) (identifying homes and wedding rings as items so personal that they must be respected as
property under the Hegelian-based personhood theory, which argues that “the strength of the
entitlement increas[es] as the object becomes more central to one’s personhood”); see also Robert
Brauneis, “The Foundation of Our ‘Regulatory Takings’ Jurisprudence”: The Myth and Meaning of Justice
Holmes’s Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613, 640 (1996) (“[T]he
institution of property is due, at least in part, to a fundamental element of psychology—the desire
to continue enjoying something that one has enjoyed for a long time and to which one has become
firmly attached.”).
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 40 (9th ed 2014) (explaining that property
rights incentivize investment); see also Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243,
1244–45 (1968) (concluding that overuse of common resources could be prevented by “sell[ing]
them off as private property”).
Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1139–40 (2000) (“The
economic rationale for intellectual property law arises from a public goods problem with
information products that this law strives to overcome . . . . [W]ithout a legal protection system,
creators will find it difficult to exclude free-riders from appropriating the fruits of their labor and
selling identical or very similar products in the marketplace at a cheaper price. The prospect of
being unable to recoup research and development costs may deter such investments from being
made in the first place.”).
Brauneis, supra note 29, at 624.
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rights model, a property right represents “an unchanging ideal boundary
between a property owner and the surrounding community.”33 To put this
concretely, the positive law model would say that tenants have rights only
because the legislature created landlord-tenant law, while the natural rights
model would suggest that landlord-tenant relationships have always existed,
and always imply basic rights and responsibilities.
This divide over property rights touches on a broader battle over natural
rights vs. positive law generally. Jurists and scholars have waged this war on
many fronts, with various rhetorical weapons. Some dismiss natural rights
entirely.34 Others suggest that natural rights influenced the Constitution’s
writing35 and may influence its interpretation.36 Still others suggest that
natural rights provide a broad basis for striking down contrary laws.37
Natural rights deeply influenced the Framers, who lauded those rights in
the Declaration38 and incorporated some into the Constitution. But the bulk
of evidence—from the Framers themselves, from early court opinions, and
from scholarly examination—suggests that once written, the Constitution
became the operative guarantor of natural rights. In 1798, Justice Iredell
explained that natural rights were not judicially enforceable: “[S]ome
speculative jurists have held, that a legislative act against natural justice must,
in itself, be void; but I cannot think that, under such a government, any Court
of Justice would possess a power to declare it so.”39 In 1830, Chief Justice

33
34

35

36

37

38

39

Id.
See, e.g., id. at 637 (“A constitutional directive to judges to test legislative enactments by engaging in
moral reasoning was for Holmes no better than a directive to follow the commands of ghosts—if
you don’t believe in ghosts, it’s hard to comply with the directive.”).
See Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, The Natural Law in the American Tradition, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1513,
1517 (2011) (“When it came to writing a Constitution, the Framers aimed to create a positive law
that would protect pre-existing natural rights.”).
See id. at 1525 (“Heller tells us that natural law can factor into constitutional interpretation in subtle,
but significant ways. It tells us that, where a constitutional provision codified a pre-existing, natural
right, the historical understanding of that natural right can clarify ambiguities in the constitutional
text and elucidate the rationale and scope of the constitutional right.”).
See Thomas E. Towe, Natural Law and the Ninth Amendment, 2 PEPP. L. REV. 270, 305 (1975) (“To the
founding fathers, the rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights constituted a partial list of those
‘essential elements of the law of nature,’ which constituted an absolute limitation on the powers of
government. These rights were considered the prime requisites of free government and were the
rights reserved to the people when the political compact, that brought the people out of the state of
nature, was entered into. Neither the legislature nor any other agency of government could modify
or evade these rights.”).
See O’Scannlain, supra note 35, at 1516 (“The Declaration is not saying, ‘we are starting this new
government and we are going to give our citizens all sorts of new rights.’ It is saying that human
beings have innate rights that everyone has a moral obligation to respect, whether or not there is a
government to define and protect those rights.”).
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 398 (1798) (Iredell, J.).
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Marshall said the same, explaining that stretching the Constitution to remedy
every ill would do violence to that document: “[T]he constitution of the
United States was not intended to furnish the corrective for every abuse of
power which may be committed by the state governments.”40 Writing in the
late 1870s, Thomas Cooley concluded that “except where the constitution
has imposed limits upon the legislative power, it must be considered as
practically absolute, whether it operate according to natural justice or not in
any particular case.”41 As Hamilton explained in the Federalist Papers, when
deciding cases, “nothing would be consulted but the constitution and the
laws.”42 This judicial humility accords with assurances from jurists like
Robert Bork and Diarmuid O’Scannlain that while they do not doubt that
natural rights exist, they do question judges’ ability to discern those rights.43
Does this leave other natural rights unprotected? No. To the Founding
Generation, the Legislature and the Executive had an obligation to
independently evaluate a law, both against the Constitution and natural
rights. As Chief Justice Marshall explained: “The interest, wisdom, and
justice of the representative body, and its relations with its constituents,
furnish the only security, where there is no express contract, against unjust
and excessive taxation; as well as against unwise legislation generally.”44
Narrowing our discussion from the general to the specific, this legislative
deference suggests that the Fourth Amendment should respect property
rights as defined by legislatures. It seems unlikely that the Framers would
freeze property law in place at the Revolution. At that very time, they were
pushing to eliminate the entail, a traditional property right that consolidated
wealth. Thomas Jefferson introduced a bill to abolish the entail in Virginia,
describing it as a practice that perpetuated “a Patrician order.”45 By ending
it, he hoped to likewise end the “aristocracy of wealth” and “make an

40
41
42
43

44
45

Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514, 563 (1830).
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 204 (4th ed. 1878).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
See Robert H. Bork, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 66
(1990) (“Judges, like the rest of us, are apt to confuse their strongly held beliefs with the order of
nature.”); see also O’Scannlain, supra note 35, at 1521 (agreeing with Bork). But see Randy E. Barnett,
Getting Normative: The Role of Natural Rights in Constitutional Adjudication, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 93,
111 (1995) (“[W]e should resolve our historical and textual doubts in favor of protecting
unenumerated rights . . . .”).
Providence Bank, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 563.
THOMAS JEFFERSON, Autobiography (1821), in THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
36 (1858). But see Claire Priest, The End of Entail: Information, Institutions, and Slavery in the American
Revolutionary Period, 33 LAW & HIST. REV. 277, 280 (2015) (suggesting that this “dominant historical
account” ignores how entailed property shielded small landowners from creditors).
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opening for the aristocracy of virtue and talent.”46 Multiple states abolished
the entail during this period,47 some by writing the prohibition into their
constitution.48 Thus, in the late 1700s, the Framers were intimately involved
in modifying a traditional property right. And this proves just one among
many examples. As Professor Thomas Merrill points out, equitable
servitudes, community property, condominiums, and securitized debt were
all later inventions.49
Freezing property law at the Revolution would show profound and
uncharacteristic shortsightedness. Instead, as Justice Chase explains in Calder
v. Bull, while property rights may arise from natural principles, their precise
boundaries must be “prescribed by positive law.”50 John Hart Ely would call
property one of “the Constitution’s various open-ended delegations to the
future.”51
This might seem to run contrary to originalist positions, often framed on
a fixed, unchanging Constitution. But here the Constitution does not
change, even though the property it protects may shift. As Justice Scalia
explained, though the objects change, the rights remain the same:
[A] latter-day alteration of property rights would also produce a latter-day
alteration of the Fourth Amendment outcome—without altering the Fourth
Amendment itself.
....
. . . [O]ur unchanging Constitution refers to other bodies of law that
might themselves change. . . . This reference to changeable law presents no
problems for the originalist. No one supposes that the meaning of the
Constitution changes as States expand and contract property rights.”52

If a legislature decides when property rights attach, can it also eliminate
those rights? No. Once rights vest, the Government must respect them. The

46
47
48
49
50

51

52

JEFFERSON, supra note 45, at 36.
Priest, supra note 45, at 278 (“During the American Revolutionary Era, New York, Virginia,
Georgia, North Carolina, Kentucky, and later Missouri and Mississippi abolished the fee tail.”).
See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. LI (“Estates shall not be entailed . . . .”).
Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 945 (2000).
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 394 (1798) (“[T]he right of property, in its origin, could only arise
from compact, express, or implied, and I think it is the better opinion, that the right, as well as the mode,
or manner, of acquiring property, and of alienating or transferring, inheriting, or transmitting it, is
conferred by society; is regulated by civil institution, and is always subject to the rules prescribed by
positive law.”).
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 39 (1980)
(“[The Framers] certainly didn’t have natural law in mind when the Constitution’s various openended delegations to the future were inserted and approved, which undoubtedly is one reason the
Constitution at no point refers to natural law.”).
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 143–44 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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early Court established this point first in 1798,53 reiterating it in 1810,54
1815,55 1829,56 and 1874.57 And this point finds echoes today in cases like
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.58 There the Supreme Court held that
government can take property without compensation only if the owner
asserts unvested rights, those to which he never had title in the first place.59
This approach makes practical sense. It does leave open the question
whether natural property rights may augment positive law. For instance, take
the unlikely scenario where a legislature eliminates fee simple ownership
entirely. We need not resolve this question. As this Article will address in
Part III, each theory conferring property rights on digital documents derives
from an existing positive law framework like the Stored Communications Act
or state privacy laws.60

53

54

55

56

57

58
59

60

See Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388–89 (“The Legislature may enjoin, permit, forbid, and punish; they
may declare new crimes; and establish rules of conduct for all its citizens in future cases; they may
command what is right, and prohibit what is wrong; but they cannot change innocence into guilt; or
punish innocence as a crime; or violate the right of an antecedent lawful private contract; or the right of private
property. To maintain that our Federal, or State, Legislature possesses such powers, if they had not
been expressly restrained; would, in my opinion, be a political heresy, altogether inadmissible in our free
republican governments.”).
See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 135 (1810) (“[I]f an act be done under a law, a succeeding
legislature cannot undo it. The past cannot be recalled by the most absolute power. Conveyances
have been made, those conveyances have vested legal estates, and, if those estates may be seized by
the sovereign authority, still, that they originally vested is a fact, and cannot cease to be a fact.”).
See Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. 43, 50–51 (1815) (“If the legislature possessed the authority to make
such a grant and confirmation [of property rights], it is very clear to our minds that it vested an
indefeasible and irrevocable title. We have no knowledge of any authority or principle which could
support the doctrine that a legislative grant is revocable in its own nature, and held only durante bene
placito. Such a doctrine would uproot the very foundations of almost all the land titles in Virginia,
and is utterly inconsistent with a great and fundamental principle of republican government, the
right of the citizens to the free enjoyment of their property regally acquired.”).
See Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. 627, 657–58 (1829) (“[A] grant or title to lands once made by the
legislature to any person or corporation is irrevocable, and cannot be re-assumed by any subsequent
legislative act; . . . a different doctrine is utterly inconsistent with the great and fundamental
principle of a republican government, and with the right of the citizens to the free enjoyment of
their property lawfully acquired.”).
See Loan Ass’n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 662 (1874) (“It must be conceded that there are . . . rights
in every free government beyond the control of the State. A government which recognized no such
rights, which held the lives, the liberty, and the property of its citizens subject at all times to the
absolute disposition and unlimited control of even the most democratic depository of power, is after
all but a despotism.”).
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
See id. at 1027 (“Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically
beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the
nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin
with.”).
See infra Part III.
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But while we need not answer the question now, it is worth noting that
natural rights also suggest respecting digital property. From a Lockeian
perspective, e-mails, online posts, digital documents, and other data all derive
from our labor creating them.61 From a Hegelian perspective, while we
might not care deeply about our iPad and our Samsung Galaxy s10, we
certainly care about their data.62 From a utilitarian perspective, respecting
digital property rights encourages using online systems and creating new
digital media.
But, in the end, this Article does not seek to define digital property. Other
able authors have taken up that task repeatedly. Rather, this Article asks
what digital property the Constitution must respect.
II. LEGISLATIVE WINE IN CONSTITUTIONAL WINESKINS
Though the Constitution looms large, it controls little. It never mentions
trusts and estates. It passes upon bankruptcy63 and contracts64 in the briefest
fashion. And it only hints at property law.65 It explicitly references property
rights66 in only two sections: the Due Process Clauses67 and the Takings
Clause.68 Courts and scholars have struggled to find a common definition of
61

62

63
64
65

66

67

68

See Donald Fishman, Reading John Locke in Cyberspace: Natural Rights and “The Commons” in a Digital Age,
41 FREE SPEECH Y.B. 34, 41 (2004) (“To use Locke’s terminology, cyberspace is a ‘vast wilderness’
in which individuals can employ their labor to create new products and services.”).
See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 395 (2014) (“[I]t is no exaggeration to say that many of the
more than 90% of American adults who own a cell phone keep on their person a digital record of
nearly every aspect of their lives—from the mundane to the intimate.”).
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States[.]”).
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall enter into any . . . Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts . . . .”).
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (describing “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures”); U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating
that no person shall be deprived of “life, liberty, or property without due process of law” and that
private property shall not “be taken for public use without just compensation”); U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that no State shall deprive a person of life, liberty, or property).
Article IV references Congress’ authority to regulate territorial and other property, but that power
bears no relation to this discussion. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (“The Congress shall have Power
to dispose of and make all needful Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging
to the United States[.]”).
See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”);
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.”).
See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”).
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“property” that gives force and effect to both clauses. Indeed, in the most
influential article on the subject, Thomas Merrill conceded that the Supreme
Court has assigned different definitions to “property” depending on the
clause where it appears.69
At first, this seems incongruent. But we should remember that just as the
Constitution (mostly) does not regulate trusts, estates, bankruptcy, or
contract, it neither recognizes nor regulates property itself.70 It does not
separate public land from private land, a house from an apartment, or my
car from yours. Instead, as we discussed in the previous Part, positive law
recognizes property rights.71 After those rights arise under positive law, the
Constitution protects certain enumerated property rights, most notably
persons, houses, papers, and effects.72
But the Fourth Amendment’s protection neither recognizes nor requires
magic labels.73 If a misguided postal worker created an ad campaign
encouraging citizens to “feel at home at the post office,” the post office does
not transform into a Fourth Amendment house. By the same logic, if a town
changed all its records to refer to residences as “public land,” they would not
thereby lose the Constitution’s aegis. Instead, the Constitution’s explicit
69

70

71

72

73

See Merrill, supra note 49, at 959 (“[I]t is desirable to have three separate patterning definitions of
constitutional property, one each for procedural due process, takings law, and substantive due
process. These definitions would act as allocational devices, steering different types of claims
involving government interference with economic interests to different bodies of constitutional
doctrine.”).
See Stern, supra note 15, at 286 (“The Constitution directs its attention to certain actions that
contravene rights established within the law of property, not to the underlying assets those rights
concern.”).
See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998) (“Because the Constitution protects
rather than creates property interests, the existence of a property interest is determined by reference
to ‘existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.’”
(quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
See id.; see also Merrill, supra note 49, at 927 (“Federal constitutional law prescribes the set of criteria
an interest must have to qualify as property; whether the claimant has an interest that fits the pattern
is then determined by examining independent sources such as state law.”); cf. United States v.
Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278–79 (2002) (internal citations omitted) (“A common idiom describes
property as a ‘bundle of sticks’—a collection of individual rights which, in certain combinations,
constitute property. State law determines only which sticks are in a person’s bundle. Whether
those sticks qualify as ‘property’ for purposes of the federal tax lien statute is a question of federal
law.”); Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 58 (1999) (“We look initially to state law to determine
what rights the taxpayer has in the property the Government seeks to reach, then to federal law to
determine whether the taxpayer’s state-delineated rights qualify as ‘property’ or ‘rights to property’
within the compass of the federal tax lien legislation.”).
Stern, supra note 15, at 286–87 (“The existence of a property right does not depend simply on
whether some other body of law uses the term ‘property’ or declares that a person has a ‘property
right.’ As with a number of areas of federal law that attach consequences to ‘property’ but do not
purport to create property themselves, the Constitution’s property clauses call for a means of
classifying the legal relationships that other legal sources create.”).
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reference to property in the Takings and Due Process Clauses and its implied
reference to property in the Fourth Amendment “implies a set of criteria for
drawing lines between different kinds of rights, benefits, or statuses”
conferred by positive law.74 If the law “create[s] a legal relationship satisfying
those criteria, a person has a property right” that the Constitution protects.75
According to Professor Thomas Merrill, the Court recognizes three such
legal relationships. The narrowest criteria define property for the Takings
Clause. Here Merrill would ask “whether nonconstitutional sources of law
confer an irrevocable right on the claimant to exclude others from specific
assets.”76 The next narrowest criteria go to procedural due process, with its
property differentiated by widening the definition from “assets” to
“entitlements.” Its “hallmark . . . is an individual entitlement grounded in
state law, which cannot be removed except ‘for cause.’”77 Finally, the widest
(and squishiest) criteria go to property for substantive due process, the
definition for which removes the “discrete assets” requirement entirely.78
Merrill’s definitions have exerted enormous influence on jurists and scholars.
In Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, both Justice Scalia’s majority opinion and
Justice Stevens’ dissent cited Merrill with approval.79 Scholars have similarly
found inspiration from Merrill’s work.80
In the previous Part, this Article concluded that property rights arise from
positive law at the time the rights vest. We next seek to answer which
74

75
76
77

78
79

80

Id. at 287; see also Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756–57 (2005) (“We will not, of
course, defer to the Tenth Circuit on the ultimate issue: whether what Colorado law has given
respondent constitutes a property interest for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. That
determination, despite its state-law underpinnings, is ultimately one of federal constitutional law.”);
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (“Although the underlying
substantive interest is created by ‘an independent source such as state law,’ federal constitutional
law determines whether that interest rises to the level of a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ protected
by the Due Process Clause.” (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972)).
Stern, supra note 15, at 287.
Merrill, supra note 49, at 969.
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982) (quoting Memphis Light, Gas & Water
Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1978)); see also Merrill, supra note 49, at 960–61 (identifying and
making non-substantive changes to this test).
Merrill, supra note 49, at 983.
See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 766 (citing Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional
Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 945 (2000)); see also id. at 791 n.19 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 964 n.289 (2000)).
See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 27, at 583 n.273 (citing Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape
of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 922 (2000)); see also M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of
Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1423 n.133 (2004) (citing Thomas W. Merrill, The
Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 892 (2000)); Ann Woolhandler & Caleb
Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 694 n.17 (2004) (citing Thomas
W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 963–64, 987–88 (2000)).
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property rights receive the Constitution’s protection. We might feel tempted
to repeat the Fourth Amendment refrain: persons, houses, papers, and
effects. After all, everyone understands those terms. But do we really? Are
shed skin cells part of my person?81 Does tenancy make it my house?82 Are
e-mails my papers?83 The courts have tried to answer these questions, but
they have done so through Katz’s reasonable-expectation-of-privacy lens.
Property provides a more stable foundation.
But to use property’s protections, we need to define constitutional
property. When I send an e-mail, does it belong to me, the recipient, my email provider, or every server operator in between? E-mails are modern-day
“papers,” but how do I know they are my papers?
A. The Right to Exclude
The right to exclude provides a good place to start. It is Merrill’s
narrowest definition, so it is unlikely to over capture. And as the Takings
Clause definition, it relates directly to physical, tangible things, much like the
Fourth Amendment’s persons, houses, papers, and effects.
For the Framing Generation, the right to exclude was the quintessential
property right. As William Pitt proclaimed, even the humblest house owner
could defy the King himself: “The poorest man may in his cottage bid
defiance to all the force of the crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the
wind may blow through it; the storms may enter, the rain may enter—but
the King of England cannot enter!”84
Again and again, courts have identified the right to exclude as the central
concept that underpins most property. In College Savings Bank, the Supreme
Court called it “[t]he hallmark of a protected property interest[.]”85 In Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, it called the right to exclude “one of the most essential
sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.”86

81
82
83
84
85
86

See Williamson v. State, 993 A.2d 626 (Md. 2010) (answering the question in the negative under the
Fourth Amendment); see also State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (finding the same).
See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006) (answering the question in the affirmative under the
Fourth Amendment).
See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010) (answering the question in the
affirmative under the Fourth Amendment).
EDWARD LATHAM, FAMOUS SAYINGS AND THEIR AUTHORS 64 (2d ed. 1906).
Coll. Sav. Bk. v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999).
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374, 384 (1994) (quoting Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S.
825, 831 (1987) (quoting Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176);Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982) (quoting Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176); see also United States v.
Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 283–84 (2002) (calling the right to exclude an “essential property right[]”).
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It has even emphasized this point to identify intangible property rights like
patents and trademarks.87
The Court and its members have also cited the right to exclude as
relevant to the Fourth Amendment. In Rakas v. Illinois, the Court
incorporated the right to exclude in its privacy analysis, noting that the
expectation of privacy found in Katz and Jones derives partly from the ability
to exclude others.88 In his Olmsted dissent, Justice Butler likewise suggested
that wiretap evidence should have been barred because “the exclusive use
of the wire belongs to the persons served by it.”89 Thus, those users had at
least some property right in it, insufficient to make them owners, but
sufficient to exclude other callers or the police. And Justice Stevens has
explained that a property owner “has a right to exclude from it all the world,”
and that government monitoring “infringes that exclusionary right.”90
Scholars have reached the same conclusion as the courts.91 As Merrill
recognized, though they may use different terminology, property theorists
repeatedly centralize the right to exclude:

87

88

89
90

91

See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (“[T]he Patent Act also declares
that ‘patents shall have the attributes of personal property,’ § 261, including ‘the right to exclude
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention,’ § 154(a)(1).” (quoting 35
U.S.C. §§ 154, 261)); see also Coll. Sav. Bk., 527 U.S. at 673 (“The Lanham Act may well contain
provisions that protect constitutionally cognizable property interests—notably, its provisions
dealing with infringement of trademarks, which are the ‘property’ of the owner because he can
exclude others from using them.”).
See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 149 (1978) (“Except with respect to his friend, Jones had
complete dominion and control over the apartment and could exclude others from it. Likewise in
Katz, the defendant occupied the telephone booth, shut the door behind him to exclude all others
and paid the toll . . . .”).
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 487 (1928) (Butler, J., dissenting).
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 729 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“The owner of property, of course, has a right to exclude from it all the world, including the
Government, and a concomitant right to use it exclusively for his own purposes. When the
Government attaches an electronic monitoring device to that property, it infringes that exclusionary
right; in a fundamental sense it has converted the property to its own use.”); see also Soldal v. Cook
County, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992) (“A ‘seizure’ of property, we have explained, occurs when ‘there is
some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.” (quoting
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)).
See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 371 (1954) (“Private
property may or may not involve a right to use something oneself. It may or may not involve a
right to sell, but whatever else it involves, it must at least involve a right to exclude others from
doing something.”); see also Pollack, supra note 25, at 107 (“[P]roperty rights are meant to
protect . . . the right to exclude others and to control access.”); see also Stern, supra note 15, at 277
(“[P]roperty is best understood as the right to have some measure of legal control over the way a
particular item is used, control that comes at the expense of all other people.”); see also Gideon
Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Reconceptualizing Trespass, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1823, 1828 (2009) (“The
right to exclude others is the most fundamental component of ownership.”).
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Whether one calls this the right to “determine how the object shall be used
and by whom,” or a “right to exclude others from things which is grounded
by the interest we have in the use of things,” or the right of “direct trespassory
protection,” or the “gatekeeper” right, this conclusion has been
independently reached over and over again. 92

B. From Specific Objects
In addition to the specific right at issue—the right to exclude—we must
consider to which objects this right attaches. Property requires in rem rights,
not merely in personam rights.93 Though the merits of this distinction have
been debated, some dividing line is universally acknowledged.94 In rem rights
have two distinct features: (1) they pertain to a res, a particular thing;95 (2)
they avail against the world entire.96 The type of property does not matter.
The Constitution extends to both real and personal property.97 It protects
both tangible and intangible property.98

92
93
94

95
96

97

98

Merrill, supra note 49, at 971.
Stern, supra note 15, at 296 (“[R]ights in rem are property rights, while rights in personam are rights
that are not property rights.”).
See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
773, 780 (2001) (“Both civil law and common law jurisdictions have long recognized that certain
legal rights are good ‘against the world’ while others apply only against named persons or entities.
This distinction, which has long endured across different legal systems, cannot be dismissed as arid
conceptualism or as a matter of attaching arbitrary labels to underlying phenomena that are really
the same.”); see also Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2056,
2058 (2004) (“[P]roperty rights run with the object, and can be contrasted with contract rights,
which bind only parties in privity.”).
See Stern, supra note 15, at 297 (“A property right, a right in rem, is centrally concerned with some
particular, singular, discrete thing—a res.”).
See Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 448 (2004) (“A bankruptcy court’s in
rem jurisdiction permits it to ‘determin[e] all claims that anyone, whether named in the action or
not, has to the property or thing in question. The proceeding is ‘one against the world.’” (citations
omitted)); see also Becher v. Contoure Labs., Inc., 279 U.S. 388, 391 (1929) (“A judgment in rem
binds all the world . . . .”); Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 27, at 533 (“[I]n contrast to contractual
rights that avail only against other parties to an agreement, property rights avail against the rest of
the world, irrespective of consent.”); Merrill & Smith, supra note 94, at 777 (“Property rights . . . are
in rem—they bind ‘the rest of the world.’”); Schwartz, supra note 94 at 2058 (“[T]his Article defines
property as any interest in an object, whether tangible or intangible, that is enforceable against the
world.”); Stern, supra note 15, at 292 (“[P]roperty rights assume a distinctive form: they pertain to
specific things and they are ‘good against the world.’”).
See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2015) (“Nothing in the text or history of the
Takings Clause, or our precedents, suggests that the rule is any different [from real property] when
it comes to the appropriation of personal property. The Government has a categorical duty to pay
just compensation when it takes your car, just as when it takes your home.”).
See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003–04 (1984) (protecting trade secrets with the
Takings Clause); Merrill & Smith, supra note 94, at 782 (“[I]n rem rights are not necessarily related
to a thing, in the sense of a tangible object. Such rights can also exist in intangibles, such as
intellectual property.”).
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This requirement for property and rights availing “against the world”
makes particular sense in the Fourth Amendment context. Obviously, no
one contracts in advance with the Government, demanding it keep out from
our houses. Nor would anyone expect us to exclude the Government from
places open to the general public. But where the world must respect our
rights, the Government must do the same.
In Parts III and IV, this Article will further consider whether the rights
granted by statute for specific digital objects fall in personam or in rem.
C. Existing Property Precedent
Existing precedent generally accords with the idea that an exclusion right
triggers Fourth Amendment property protection. Jones had the right to keep
trackers off his Jeep.99 Jardines could bar unwelcome visitors from his
yard.100 Silverman could shoo snoops away from his heating ducts.101
This approach does create notable problems in one precedential area:
open fields. Well before Katz, Hester v. United States permitted Prohibition
officers to trespass “fifty to one hundred yards away” from the house.102 It
held that the Fourth Amendment did not extend to open fields.103 After
deciding Katz, the Supreme Court again considered the issue, this time
refusing to exclude marihuana found growing on defendant’s land, “over a
mile from [his] home.”104 The Court grounded its analysis principally in the
lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy.105 But the Court seemed to go
out of its way to denigrate the property approach, calling property rights “but
one element in determining whether expectations of privacy are
legitimate.”106 Obviously this abandonment of the property approach has

99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106

See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (holding that the attachment of a GPS device to a
vehicle without a warrant was a violation of the Fourth Amendment).
See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) (holding that the use of drug-sniffing dog by law
enforcement on a front porch was a search for Fourth Amendment purposes).
See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (holding that attaching a microphone to a
house’s heating duct was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment).
Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58–59 (1924).
See id. at 59 (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not protect open fields).
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
See id. at 180 (“[N]o expectation of privacy legitimately attaches to open fields.”).
Id. at 183.
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been itself abandoned or at least reinterpreted by Jones107 and Jardines.108
Nonetheless, in deciding Oliver, the Court holds clearly that open fields are
neither “houses”109 nor “effects” as the Framers would have understood
them.110
This creates tension with our proposed rule, which suggests a Fourth
Amendment property right whenever an owner may exclude others. The
obvious answer restates our rule to incorporate the Fourth Amendment’s
textual limitations: A Fourth Amendment property right arises when an owner may
generally exclude others from a person, house, paper, or effect.
This reconciles our rule with precedent, but seems unsatisfying. On the
one hand, grounding our analysis in the Constitution’s text always provides
a useful focus. In writing, ratifying, and following that governing document
for more than two centuries, we have made a social compact, reaffirmed each
time we hew to its text. And a textual approach checks the understandable
though misguided urge for judicial opinion or scholarly theory to create
rights untethered from that compact. Yet when advancing a Fourth
Amendment theory based on property rights, this leaves a gaping hole in that
theory.
Open fields precedent undermines not merely property rights, but
equality before the law.111 A trespassing citizen merits arrest. When the
Government trespasses without consequence, as it did in Oliver, Government
officers set themselves above the law.112 This Article does not offer a
107

108

109
110

111

112

See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406–07 (2012) (“Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not
rise or fall with the Katz formulation. . . . As explained, for most of our history the Fourth
Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the
areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) it enumerates. Katz did not repudiate that
understanding.”).
See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013) (“The Katz reasonable-expectations test ‘has been
added to, not substituted for,’ the traditional property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment,
and so is unnecessary to consider when the government gains evidence by physically intruding on
constitutionally protected areas.” (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 409)).
See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 176 (“The distinction between [open fields] and the house is as old as the
common law.” (quoting Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924))).
See id. at 177 (explaining that Madison replaced “other property” with “effects” during drafting,
which “broadened the scope of the Amendment in some respects,” but “cannot be said to
encompass open fields”).
See Baude & Stern, supra note 21, at 1847 (“[T]he very term ‘rule of law’ was coined by A.V. Dicey
to capture the idea of a political system in which ‘no man is above the law,’ meaning in particular
that it ‘excludes the idea of any exemption of officials or others from the duty of obedience to the
law which governs other citizens.’ To place officials above the law would be to subvert this
fundamental principle of political liberty.”).
See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 194–95 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[A] deliberate entry by a private citizen
onto private property marked with ‘No Trespassing’ signs will expose him to criminal liability. I
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satisfying conclusion to this conundrum. Perhaps the proper route uses
Article V to expand the property definition. Other authors suggest that any
breach of positive law—trespassing, for example—should trigger the Fourth
Amendment.113
Fourth Amendment property may sweep more broadly than the right to
exclude suggested under the Takings Clause. But these definitions nest, so
any property protected by the Takings Clause will receive Fourth
Amendment protection. Because this Article argues that traditional property
definitions grant Fourth Amendment protections to digital data right now, the
remainder will assume arguendo that we must satisfy the narrower, more
well-established Takings property definition. But should that proposition
find acceptance, the outer boundaries of Fourth Amendment property merit
further investigation.
III. THEORIES OF EXCLUSION: COPYRIGHT, THE CFAA, THE SCA, AND
PRIVACY LAWS
When positive law recognizes a right to exclude, the Constitution treats
it as a property right. We must next ask which positive law might grant a
right to exclude others from our digital data, even when held by third parties.
At least four statutory schemes come to mind: copyright law, state privacy
laws, the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and the federal Stored
Communications Act. Each recognizes at least some right to control digital
data even when held by others.
A. Copyright
The Copyright Act protects “original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression.”114 Every document, e-mail, photo, and

113
114

see no reason why a government official should not be obliged to respect such unequivocal and
universally understood manifestations of a landowner’s desire for privacy.”).
See generally, Baude & Stern, supra note 21 (suggesting that the Fourth Amendment should use
positive law as its baseline).
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018).
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other original work gets copyright protection115 simply by its creation.116 And
with that copyright come six exclusive rights automatically assigned to the
creator: (1) reproducing the copyrighted work, (2) preparing derivative
works, (3) distributing copies, (4) performing the copyrighted work, (5)
displaying the copyrighted work, and (6) transmitting the copyrighted
work.117
Copyrights seem to grant the right to exclude what we are seeking. They
apply to digital “papers,” they refer to a specific thing, they provide “the right
to exclude others[,]”118 and they avail against the entire world entire.119 But
there is a problem. Several, actually. And they all stem from the same root:
copyright does not principally protect individual rights.120 Rather, as the
Constitution makes plain, it “promote[s] the Progress of Science and useful
Arts.”121 We should not confuse the path with the destination.122 Copyright
law “secur[es] for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
115

116
117

118

119

120

121
122

The work must satisfy the originality, authorship, and fixation requirements. But the law draws
these concepts broadly. Originality “means only that the work was independently created by the
author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree
of creativity.” Feist Publ’ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). Authorship
requires only that the work involve human creativity, any method “by which the ideas in the mind
of the author are given visible expression.” Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53,
58 (1884). Fixation includes even representations in temporary memory like RAM. See MAI Sys.
Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993).
See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2018) (“Copyright in a work created on or after January 1, 1978, subsists
from its creation . . . .”).
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018). Performance, distribution, and transmission apply only to certain types
of works. For example, transmission applies “in the case of sound recordings” and grants the right
to “perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.” Id. § 106.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (“Like a patent owner, a copyright
holder possesses ‘the right to exclude others from using his property.’” (quoting Fox Film Corp. v.
Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932))).
See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996) (“A copyright is a right against
the world.”); see also Forest Park Pictures v. Universal Television Network, Inc., 683 F.3d 424, 431
(2d Cir. 2012) (emphasizing the same principle); Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 302 F.3d 1334,
1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (following the reasoning of ProCD); Samuelson, supra note 31, at 1155 (“A true
intellectual property right provides the owner with rights to exclude that are good against the world
at large as to innovations that are generally widely distributed to the public.”).
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“The monopoly
privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a
special private benefit.”).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994) (“We have often recognized the monopoly
privileges Congress has authorized, while ‘intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and
inventors by the provision of a special reward,’ are limited in nature and must ultimately serve the
public good.” (quoting Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429)); see also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair
return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic
creativity for the general public good.”).
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to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”123 But it does so as a
mechanism for advancing a deeper commitment, “enriching the general
public through access to creative works.”124
To that end, Congress limited copyright in two substantial ways: First, it
required that copyright registrants deposit their works with the Copyright
Office, facilitating public access upon copyright expiration.125 Second,
Congress built statutory safe harbors from infringement claims, like fair
use.126 Both provisions are inconsistent with a right to exclude that we should
deem a Fourth Amendment property right.
Though copyright attaches upon creation, the ability to enforce that
copyright comes only with registration.127 And registration requires
depositing the work with the Copyright Office.128 This deposit requirement
has existed in one form or another since 1790.129 Through the deposit
requirement, the Library of Congress receives and can make available any

123
124
125
126

127

128
129

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 527.
See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429 (“[Copyright] is intended . . . to allow the public access to the
products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.”).
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (“From the infancy of copyright
protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to
fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . .’”) (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018) (“Except for an action brought for a violation of the rights of the
author under section 106A(a), and subject to the provisions of subsection (b), no civil action for
infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or
registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title.”); see also Reed
Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 157 (2010) (“Subject to certain exceptions, the Copyright
Act (Act) requires copyright holders to register their works before suing for copyright
infringement.”).
See 17 U.S.C. § 408(b) (2018) (mandating deposit for registration).
See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 12, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078 (“No action or proceeding shall be
maintained for infringement of copyright in any work until the provisions of this Act with respect
to the deposit of copies and registration of such work shall have been complied with.”); see also Act
of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 90, 16 Stat. 198, 213 (“[N]o person shall be entitled to a copyright unless
he shall . . . deposit in the mail a printed copy of the title of the book or other article . . . .”); see also
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 3, 1 Stat. 124, 125 (“[N]o person shall be entitled to the benefit of
this act . . . unless he shall first deposit . . . a printed copy of the title of such map, chart, book or
books . . . .”); see also John B. Koegel, Bamboozlement: The Repeal of Copyright Registration Incentives, 13
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 529, 529–31 (1995) (discussing history of the Hughes Repeal Bill,
which repealed registration incentives); see also Arthur J. Levine & Jeffrey L. Squires, Notice, Deposit
and Registration: The Importance of Being Formal, 24 UCLA. L. REV. 1232, 1253 (1977) (“The
requirement that an author must, as a precondition to the full benefits of copyright, register his
claim and deposit his work with a designated public official antedates American copyright law and
has been a part of every copyright law enacted in this country.”).
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work seeking copyright.130 Former Librarian of Congress James H.
Billington testified that these deposits have served to build “the world’s most
comprehensive collections in all formats, used by scholars every day and
available to all comers.”131 Mandatory deposit accomplishes copyright’s goal
to serve the public good by making government and public access a
requirement for copyright’s exclusionary power. In a similar way, fair use
serves the public good by permitting laudable uses for the copyrighted work
even over the copyright holder’s objection.
Now codified by statute, fair use permits third parties to override a
copyright holder’s exclusive rights “for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, [and] research.”132 So long as
their use is reasonable—as determined by a multi-factor test including
elements like commercial or non-profit use—then it is “not an infringement
of copyright.”133 Fair use actually encourages new authorship by permitting
prior protected works to form the inspiration and foundation for new
works.134 For that reason, “[f]rom the infancy of copyright protection,” fair
use was “thought necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”135
Both these limits—fair use and mandatory deposit—demonstrate that
while the copyright law provides a right to exclude, it is not the type of right
to exclude necessary to support Fourth Amendment protections. Requiring
that the accused turn over property to the government seems inconsistent
with giving the accused the right not to turn over property to the government.
And giving third-party document holders the right to copy the documents

130

131

132
133
134

135

See Koegel, supra note 129, at 533–34 (“[S]ection 411(a) is said to produce three benefits: it provides
an incentive (1) to register and (2) to deposit works that are passed along to the Library of Congress,
and (3) it establishes prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright.”).
Copyright Reform Act of 1993: Hearings on H.R. 897 Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. and Judicial
Admin. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), 182 (statement of James H.
Billington, Librarian of Congress); see also Levine & Squires, supra note 129, at 1254 (“By requiring
deposit in the Library of Congress of a copy or copies of any work in which statutory copyright is
claimed, the copyright law has fostered the development and growth of a national collection of this
country’s creative product and culture.”).
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018).
Id. § 107.
See Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436) (“In truth, in literature,
in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which, in an abstract sense, are
strictly new and original throughout. Every book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must
necessarily borrew [sic], and use much which was well known and used before.”).
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8).
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when such copying serves the public interest—such as by sending them to
law enforcement—likewise fails to “secure . . . houses, papers, and effects.”136
B. Privacy Laws
State privacy laws seem more likely to create property rights in digital
data. Professor William Prosser’s traditional privacy torts bar intrusion upon
seclusion, public disclosure of embarrassing private facts, false light, and
appropriation of name or likeness.137 The first three create no property
rights. Intrusion upon seclusion punishes the intrusion,138 but does not create
a right that travels with the information obtained.139 Neither public
disclosure140 nor false light141 offer any durable right to exclude. They
prevent only public disclosure, not possession or private disclosure.142 Only
appropriation143 might be considered a property right.144 But a right
carefully circumscribed to name and likeness provides no real benefit in the
Fourth Amendment context.
Data breach laws more broadly cover all personal information.
Pennsylvania uses a typical definition:

136
137
138

139

140

141

142

143

144

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (listing torts pertaining to privacy).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“One who intentionally
intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or
concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person.”).
See Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (refusing to extend intrusion upon
seclusion to news professionals who merely received and publicized information that was wrongfully
obtained).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“One who gives publicity
concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if
the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b)
is not of legitimate concern to the public.”).
See id. § 652E (“One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before
the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if (a) the false
light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the
actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and
the false light in which the other would be placed.”).
There is also some question about these torts pointing to a specific thing. While I do not think a res
needs a specific document—intellectual property has never required this—I do think it needs
specifically quantifiable data. Names, addresses, phone numbers, social security numbers, etc. are
all specifically quantifiable. But a jury must assess private facts and false light on a case-by-case
basis.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“One who appropriates
to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy.”).
DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 33 (6th ed. 2018) (“The
appropriation tort is akin to a property right . . . .”).
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An individual’s first name or first initial and last name in combination with
and linked to any one or more of the following data elements when the data
elements are not encrypted or redacted:
(i) Social Security number.
(ii) Driver’s license number or a State identification card number issued
in lieu of a driver’s license.
(iii) Financial account number, credit or debit card number, in
combination with any required security code, access code or password
that would permit access to an individual’s financial account. 145

But Pennsylvania—like other states—provides no private right of action
to enforce its statute.146 More importantly, it provides no right to exclude.
It neither prohibits companies from possessing data nor from sharing it with
others. It doesn’t even punish breaches (or failure to provide adequate
security to prevent them). It only punishes a failure to notify when a breach
occurs.147
This laissez faire attitude is common in the United States. Indeed, it
traditionally differentiates European law from U.S. law. European law
focuses on a right to respect and personal dignity that includes controlling
one’s own information, even when it leaves a person’s hands.148 The
European General Data Protection Regulation (“the GDPR”) embodies this
approach. The GDPR imposes obligations on anyone controlling149 or

145
146

147

148

149

73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2302 (West 2006).
See id. § 2308 (“The Office of Attorney General shall have exclusive authority to bring an action
under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law for a violation of this act.”); see
also N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(6)(a) (McKinney 2019) (“[W]henever the attorney general shall
believe . . . that there is a violation of this article he or she may bring an action in the name and on
behalf of the people of the state of New York . . . .”). But see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.010 (2019)
(permitting private actions).
See 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2303 (West 2006) (“An entity that maintains, stores or
manages computerized data that includes personal information shall provide notice of any breach
of the security of the system following discovery of the breach of the security of the system to any
resident of this Commonwealth whose unencrypted and unredacted personal information was or is
reasonably believed to have been accessed and acquired by an unauthorized person.”).
See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J.
1151, 1161 (2004) (“Continental privacy protections are, at their core, a form of protection of a
right to respect and personal dignity. The core continental privacy rights are rights to one’s image, name,
and reputation, and what Germans call the right to informational self-determination—the right to control
the sorts of information disclosed about oneself.”).
See Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the
Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation), art. 4(7), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 33 (EU) (“‘[C]ontroller’ means the natural or legal
person, public authority, agency or other body which . . . determines the purposes and means of
the processing of personal data . . . .”).
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processing personal data.150 These obligations include the subject’s right to
access,151 correct,152 and delete153 his or her data. Importantly, any entity
that controls or processes data becomes subject to the GDPR.154 The right
follows the data.
In the United States, we have traditionally focused on freedom from State
intrusion.155 Even as corporations like Google and others vacuum up vast
personal information, we remain curiously unengaged. In fairness, this
seeming negligence likely has at least some roots in our enduring respect for
contract rights. After all, unwise as it might be, users click and consent to
contracts granting companies broad powers over our data. Whatever the
motivation, our myopic focus on State power has ironically left us more
vulnerable to the State. As information becomes available to these
companies, the third-party rule makes it available to the State. More and
more we live less and less of our lives free from the Government’s view.
But the U.S. emphasis on contractual rights over inherent privacy
protections may be shifting. In 2018, the California Consumer Privacy Act
(“the CCPA”) became law.156 It took effect in 2020.157 It is by far the most
comprehensive data privacy law in the United States, though less farreaching than the GDPR.158 Among its limitations, the CCPA confines itself
to personal data from California residents.159 It also limits the consumer to
“request[ing] that a business delete any personal information about the
consumer which the business has collected from the consumer.”160 The right appears
far from absolute, and essentially in personam, directed at the relationship
between business and customer, not the data itself.
But at least some rights appear to travel with the data. For example, the
CCPA grants the consumer an absolute right to bar a data collector from
150
151
152
153
154
155

156

157
158
159
160

See id. art. 4(8) (“‘[P]rocessor’ means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other
body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller[.]”).
See id. art. 15 (protecting the right to access to one’s personal data).
See id. art. 16 (protecting the right to correct one’s personal data).
See id. art. 17 (protecting the right to delete one’s personal data).
See id. arts. 4(7)–4(8) (defining “controller” and “processor,” respectively).
See Whitman, supra note 148, at 1161 (“At its conceptual core, the American right to privacy still
takes much the form that it took in the eighteenth century: It is the right to freedom from intrusions
by the state, especially in one’s own home.”).
See Carol A.F. Umhoefer & Tracy Shapiro, CCPA vs. GDPR: The Same, Only Different, DLA PIPER
(Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2019/04/ipt-news-q12019/ccpa-vs-gdpr/ (comparing California’s Consumer Privacy Act with the GDPR).
See id.
See id. (“In some respects, however, the CCPA does not go as far as GDPR.”).
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(g) (West 2020) (“‘Consumer’ means a natural person who is a
California resident . . . .”).
See id. § 1798.105(a) (emphasis added).
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selling the consumer’s data.161 Third parties that obtain or currently hold a
consumer’s data must ensure they have consent before they can sell it.162 But
it appears consumers cannot sue when businesses violate this section.163 The
statute only provides a private right of action for failing to reasonably prevent
data breaches.164 That action does appear to travel with the data.165 It does
not limit itself to businesses receiving their data from the consumer.166
Are these property rights? It seems unlikely. They include only a
carefully constrained right to reasonable security against data breaches. The
more elaborate rights are not privately enforceable. For the time being,
privacy law fails to offer the right to exclude necessary to create a true
property right. But if privacy laws continue in this direction, it seems only a
matter of time.
C. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
For over 30 years, the federal government has used the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act (“the CFAA”) as its primary statutory tool for combating
cybercrime. Enacted in 1984, the CFAA was originally a narrow statute
designed to criminalize access to computers in which the federal government
had a substantial interest.167 But with successive changes over time, a statute
that originally barred hacking into sensitive government computers or

161

162

163

164

165

166
167

See id. § 1798.120(a) (“A consumer shall have the right, at any time, to direct a business that sells
personal information about the consumer to third parties not to sell the consumer’s personal
information. This may be referred to as the right to opt-out.”).
See id. § 1798.115(d) (“A third party shall not sell personal information about a consumer that has
been sold to the third party by a business unless the consumer has received explicit notice and is
provided an opportunity to exercise the right to opt-out pursuant to Section 1798.120.”).
See David Stauss, CCPA: Bill to Expand Private Right of Action Fails, JD SUPRA (May 17, 2019),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ccpa-bill-to-expand-private-right-of-65974/ (“The current
version of the CCPA only allows individual consumers to sue for certain types of data breaches and
leaves enforcement of the CCPA’s privacy-related rights to the California Attorney General’s
Office.”).
See id. (“[T]he CCPA allows consumers to seek statutory damages . . . for data breaches due to a
business’s failure to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices.”); see
generally CIV. CODE § 1798.150 (authorizing data breach actions).
See CIV. CODE § 1798.150(a)(1) (“Any consumer whose nonencrypted and nonredacted personal
information . . . is subject to an unauthorized access and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure as a result
of the business’s violation of the duty to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures
and practices . . . may institute a civil action . . . .”).
See generally id.
See Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §
2102(a), 98 Stat. 2190, 2190–92 (making punishable unauthorized access to information on
computers “determined by the United States Government . . . to require protection against
unauthorized disclosure”).
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centralized financial databases now federally criminalizes all hacking.168
This includes hacking where the target computer resides on the same street,
on the same floor, or even in the same room as the hacker, so long as the
target is connected to the Internet.169 The statute also gives private parties
the ability to enforce its terms through civil suits.170
The CFAA punishes whoever “intentionally accesses a computer without
authorization or exceeds authorized access.”171 In its wisdom, Congress
never defined “authorization.”172 But though courts and scholars have
propounded four or more theories for authorization,173 this split need not
trouble us. The theories disagree on presumption (access or denial), method
(implicit or explicit), and clarity (code-based, contract-based, or other).174
But all the theories agree that the system owner must somehow authorize the
access.175 And thus all the theories provide a right to exclude.
As we have conceived property rights, the CFAA thus seems plainly to
grant a property right. And that accords well with courts and scholars, which
have treated the CFAA as enforcing a property-centered anti-trespass

168

169

170
171

172

173

174
175

See Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1561
(2010) (“The statute, originally designed to criminalize only important federal interest computer
crimes, potentially regulates every use of every computer in the United States and even many
millions of computers abroad.”).
Subsequent amendment expanded the “protected computer” definition yet again, now reaching
any computer even “affecting” interstate commerce. See id. at 1569–71 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030
(2010)). Under current Commerce Clause jurisprudence, this would likely reach every computer,
even those lacking any Internet connection. See id. (stating that the amendments make it likely that
the statute “does not merely cover computers connected to the Internet that are actually ‘used’ in
interstate commerce. Instead, it applies to all computers, period, so long as the federal government
has the power to regulate them.”). But given the Internet’s modern ubiquity, this may mean a legal
distinction without practical difference.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2018).
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2). Similar language appears throughout the statute, but (a)(2) is the broadest
and most frequently charged provision. See Tim Wu, Fixing the Worst Law in Technology, NEW
YORKER (Mar. 18, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/fixing-the-worst-law-intechnology (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(c) as “the broadest provision”).
See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 582 n.10 (1st Cir. 2001) (“Congress did
not define the phrase ‘without authorization,’ perhaps assuming that the words speak for
themselves. The meaning, however, has proven to be elusive.”).
See Patricia L. Bellia, A Code-Based Approach to Unauthorized Access Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1442, 1445 (2016) (“[T]he caselaw reflects at least five different
interpretive paradigms.”); see also Kelsey T. Patterson, Narrowing It Down to One Narrow View: Clarifying
and Limiting the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 7 CHARLESTON L. REV. 489, 492 (2013) (giving the four
differing approaches circuit courts have used: “agency-based, broad contract-based, code-based,
and narrow contract-based”).
See Michael J. O’Connor, The Common Law of Cyber-Trespass, 85 BROOK. L. REV. 421, 427–447
(2020) (organizing and categorizing approaches).
See id. (discussing this requirement in each theory).
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right.176 But two objections suggest themselves: the problem with third-party
enforcement and the statute’s law enforcement exception.
1. Third-Party CFAA Enforcement
As a computer hacking statute, one might assume that the CFAA protects
computers, not computer documents. By that logic, its right to exclude
extends to the computer owner, not the document owner. In other words,
Google can enforce it, not the Gmail user. But all the caselaw thus far
disagrees.
In Theofel v. Farey-Jones, a civil litigant “used a ‘patently unlawful’
subpoena to gain access to e-mail stored by [the opposing parties’] Internet
service provider.”177 When the opposing parties learned that the ISP had
turned over their e-mails without notice from either the litigant or the ISP,
they sued under the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act, and the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.178 The district court dismissed the CFAA
claim “on the theory that the Act does not apply to unauthorized access of a
third party’s computer.”179 But the Ninth Circuit held this was error and
that the CFAA extends to third-party computers:
The district court erred by reading an ownership or control requirement into
the Act. The civil remedy extends to “[a]ny person who suffers damage or loss
by reason of a violation of this section.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (emphasis
added). . . . Individuals other than the computer’s owner may be
proximately harmed by unauthorized access, particularly if they have rights
to data stored on it.180

District courts across three other circuits have also addressed the point, and
unanimously agree with Theofel that third-party computer ownership poses

176

177
178
179
180

See, e.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The CFAA
prohibits acts of computer trespass by those who are not authorized users or who exceed authorized
use.”); United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 525 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Congress enacted the CFAA in
1984 to address ‘computer crime,’ which was then principally understood as ‘hacking’ or trespassing
into computer systems or data.”); Josh Goldfoot & Aditya Bamzai, A Trespass Framework for the Crime
of Hacking, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1477, 1478 (2016) (“The text, structure, and history of the
CFAA all indicate that its ‘without authorization’ term incorporates preexisting physical trespass
rules.”); Orin S. Kerr, Norms of Computer Trespass, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1146 (2016)
(“[C]oncepts of authorization rest on trespass norms.”); O’Connor, supra note 174 at 422–23
(agreeing that trespass norms can be used to resolve CFAA authorization).
Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004).
See id. at 1071–72 (giving background on cause of action).
Id. at 1078.
Id.
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no obstacle to a CFAA claim.181 Thus, it appears that document owners can
exercise the CFAA’s right to exclude even when hosting documents on
servers owned by others.
2. The Law Enforcement Exemption and Unconstitutional Conditions
One might also object to inferring a broad right to exclude from the
CFAA because the statute exempts law enforcement.182 (Privacy laws
contain similar exceptions, and similar objections arise there.) But when the
Government grants a property right, exempting itself from that property
right seems unconstitutional.
Imagine a similar scenario in the physical world. The Government wants
to sell public land for private homes, as it has done many times in the past.183
But the land runs adjacent to a sensitive wildlife area. The sale thus
engenders massive opposition from environmental groups. To assuage their
concerns, the Government inserts a condition into the deeds for the sale:
buyers waive the warrant requirement and consent to any “environmental
inspection” of their land, including their house and curtilage. This scenario
would horrify the Framers, living in a time when the country retained vast
public land, ready for taming by citizens.
The Framers’ discontent finds jurisprudential purchase in the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Speaking for the Court, Justice Stewart
explained the doctrine thus:
[E]ven though a person has no “right” to a valuable governmental benefit
and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number
of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely.

181

182

183

See, e.g., Phillips Med. Sys. P.R., Inc. v. GIS Partners Corp., 203 F. Supp. 3d 221, 230 (D.P.R. 2016)
(“Moreover, ‘[i]ndividuals other than the computer’s owner’ may bring an action under the CFAA
because they ‘may be proximately harmed by unauthorized access, particularly if they have rights to data
stored on [the computer],’” (quoting Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis
added))); Oce N. Am., Inc. v. MCS Services, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 2d 481, 487 (D. Md. 2010) (“Plaintiff
correctly cites to Theofel v. Farey-Jones for the proposition that it does not need to own the ‘protected
computer’ in order to claim damages for a violation of the CFAA . . . .”); Nexans Wires S.A. v.
Sark-USA, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 468, 472–78 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that confidential document
owner could enforce CFAA when stolen documents were stored on business partner’s server, but
finding loss insufficient to trigger CFAA private-action threshold), aff’d, 166 F. App’x 559 (2d Cir.
2006).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(f) (2018) (“This section does not prohibit any lawfully authorized investigative,
protective, or intelligence activity of a law enforcement agency of the United States, a State, or a
political subdivision of a State, or of an intelligence agency of the United States.”).
See, e.g., Homestead Act of 1862, Pub. L. No. 37-64, 12 Stat. 392 (providing a method for citizens
to buy public lands).
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It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his
constitutionally protected interests . . . .184

Some question whether a unified unconstitutional conditions doctrine
exists. Professor Cass Sunstein views the prohibition on such conditions as a
subsidiary element to the specific right at issue.185 Rather than trying to
create a unified theory around unconstitutional conditions, he would direct
attention to the constitutional right that the condition seeks to abridge.186 He
would determine whether the condition “makes the particular burden a
constitutionally troublesome one, and, if so, whether the government has
available to it—because of the setting—distinctive justifications that make its
action permissible.”187
Applying Sunstein’s standard, the government’s CFAA exemption
plainly crosses the line. From the country’s inception, the government has
routinely recognized new property rights. Patents and copyrights were
sought and issued, currency and bonds printed and distributed, and public
land carved up and sold into private hands. In each case, the government
recognized the constitutional limitations granted alongside that property
right. Patents and copyrights cannot be revoked without due process,188
federal bonds cannot be taxed by the states,189 and private property cannot
be searched without a warrant.190

184

185

186
187
188

189

190

Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); see also Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R.
Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583, 593–94 (1926) (“[A]s a general rule, the state, having power to deny a
privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to impose. But the power of the
state in that respect is not unlimited; and one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions
which require the relinquishment of constitutional rights. If the state may compel the surrender of
one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all.
It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be
manipulated out of existence.”).
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Is There an Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine?, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 337,
338 (1989) (“Whether a condition is permissible is a function of the particular constitutional
provision at issue; on that score, anything so general as an unconstitutional conditions doctrine is
likely to be quite unhelpful.”).
See id. at 344 (“[U]nconstitutional conditions problems require a quite particular analysis of the
nature of the relevant right.”).
Id. at 345.
See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bk., 527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999)
(“Patents . . . have long been considered a species of property. . . . As such, they are surely included
within the ‘property’ of which no person may be deprived by a State without due process of law.”).
See Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449, 469 (1829) (“The tax on government
stock is thought by this Court to be a tax on the contract, a tax on the power to borrow money on
the credit of the United States, and consequently to be repugnant to the [C]onstitution.”).
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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But perhaps some unifying principle exists around unconstitutional
conditions, as scholars like Professor Richard Epstein have suggested.191 As
an initial gating mechanism, the doctrine only applies when the Government
attempts to bypass constitutional prohibitions “by obtaining bargained-for
consent of the party whose conduct is to be restricted.”192 Without that
consent, we need not even consider unconstitutional conditions. Here the
Government did not obtain individualized consent from computer owners to
bypass the CFAA’s authorization requirement. Thus we return to regular
constitutional order, where the Government cannot merely use its
“monopoly of force” to overcome objections.193 The Fourth Amendment’s
bargain remains intact, and access requires a warrant.
But let us assume that we can imply some consent. The Government
need not have extended this property right under the CFAA in the first place.
By seeking to enforce this property right against the Government that wants
to access our files without a warrant, we could be seen to consent to the
government’s law enforcement carveout. At this point, we turn to the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine proper. Professor Epstein views the
doctrine as an outgrowth of common-law guarantees like duress and
misrepresentation, which ensure full, free, and fair consent before holding
contractual promises binding.194
Protecting consent normally protects liberty.195 But Professor Epstein
posits that sometimes consent’s one-to-one bargaining process breaks down
society’s bargaining ability. He uses voting rights as a noteworthy example:
“Voting rights, for example, may be of little value to any given individual,
who would surrender them gladly for a right to do business on public
highways. If many individuals did so, the combined effect would be to ensure
a structural tyranny and the loss of many other liberties.”196 He identifies
three areas where the interaction between individual choice and government

191

192
193
194

195

196

See generally, Richard A. Epstein, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of
Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988) (providing a framework to understand unconstitutional
conditions and showing its operation in a variety of contexts).
Id. at 7.
See id. at 102 (“When the government uses only its monopoly of force to achieve its ends, classic
constitutional questions arise under particular constitutional provisions.”).
See id. at 8 (“Duress, force, misrepresentation, undue influence, and incompetence may be used to
set aside contracts that otherwise meet the normal requirements of offer, acceptance, consideration,
and consent.”).
Cf. LOCKE, supra note 28, at 269 (“Men being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and
independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another,
without his own consent.”).
Epstein, supra note 191, at 54.
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pressure creates problems: monopoly, collective action dilemmas, and
externalities.197 Of these, monopoly seems most relevant to our discussion.
Monopoly arises where “the market has a single seller who can set terms
for sale that maximize his own profits.”198 The Supreme Court confronted
the monopoly strain of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in cases
where states discriminated against out-of-state companies by leveraging the
state’s exclusive power to license corporations. The Court held that the State
could not burden out-of-state companies with a tax it declined to impose on
in-state companies.199 As with recognizing corporations, the Government
likewise has a monopoly in recognizing private property rights. Whether
justified by natural or positive law, without government recognition, private
property rights have no force behind them.200 Government would likely
prefer to recognize constitutional protections for persons and houses—if only
to avoid the same Revolutionary misfortune that befell our previous
government—but withhold such protections for other property rights. But
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine puts the Government to the difficult
choice: recognize all or recognize none. Since we plainly recognize
constitutional protections for other property rights, the Government must
recognize them here.201
The CFAA grants a right to exclude, both to system owners and to system
users with confidential documents. Because the Government cannot
legitimately carve itself an exemption from the Fourth Amendment
protections applicable to all property, the CFAA should effectively extend
Fourth Amendment protections to digital documents even when hosted on
third-party systems.

197

198
199

200

201

See id. at 102 (“[T]he traditional norms prohibiting coercion and duress are insufficient to police the
legal monopoly that government exercises over certain critical domains. As a matter of general
theory, the emphasis must shift from transactional to institutional justice, at which point three
problems become paramount: monopoly, collective action dilemmas, and externalities.”).
Id. at 16.
See S. Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 418 (1910) (“We hold, therefore, that to tax the foreign
corporation for carrying on business under the circumstances shown, by a different and much more
onerous rule than is used in taxing domestic corporations for the same privilege, is a denial of the
equal protection of the laws . . . .”).
See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, OR THE MATTER, FORME, & POWER OF A COMMON-WEALTH
ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVILL 105 (1651) (“If a Covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties
performe presently, but trust one another; in the condition of meer Nature, (which is a condition of
Warre of every man against every man,) upon any reasonable suspition, it is Voyd: But if there be
a common Power set over them both, with right and force sufficient to compell performance; it is
not Voyd.”).
See Epstein, supra note 191, at 38 (“If forced to choose between exclusion and admission on equal
terms, the states do the latter . . . .”).
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D. The Stored Communications Act
The Stored Communications Act ("the SCA”) prevents companies that
publicly offer communication or computing services from sharing the data
provided by their users.202 This prohibition comes riven with exceptions.
Among others, it only restricts providers offering services to the public.203
And even public providers can share data for multiple reasons.204 But where
the right applies, subscribers may individually enforce it by civil action.205
As with privacy laws and the CFAA, law enforcement exceptions exist.
Strangely, though, the Stored Communications Act sometimes turns these
exceptions on their head. Often, the SCA restricts a provider more when it
comes to disclosing data to the Government. For example, providers can
disclose metadata “to any person other than a governmental entity.”206 But
the Stored Communications Act includes no exclusionary rule.207 If the
provider can share the data with a third party but not the Government, does
the Constitution forbid the Government from using the information?
This question lacks an easy answer. On one hand, as the Restatement of
Torts explains, a person licensed to enter property cannot circumvent
prohibitions levied against others:
A grants permission to B, his neighbor, to enter A’s land and draw water
from A’s spring for B’s own use. A has specifically refused permission to C
to enter A’s land and draw water from the spring. At C’s instigation, B enters
A’s land and obtains for C water from the spring. B’s entry is a trespass.208
202

203

204
205
206

207

208

See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2018) (“Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c)—(1) a person or entity
providing an electronic communication service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to any
person or entity the contents of a communication while in electronic storage by that service; and (2)
a person or entity providing remote computing service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to
any person or entity the contents of any communication which is carried or maintained by that
service[.]”).
See ORIN S. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW 680 (4th ed. 2018) (“Importantly, § 2702 imposes
restrictions only on providers of ECS and RCS that provide services ‘to the public.’ Nonpublic
providers can voluntarily disclose information freely without violating the SCA.”).
See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b) & (c) (providing exceptions for disclosure of communications and customer
records).
See 18 U.S.C. § 2707 (providing for civil actions).
18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(6); see also Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a
Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1222 (2004) (“[N]oncontent records
can be disclosed to nongovernment entities without restriction.” (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(6)).
See United States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 358 (5th Cir. 2014) (“[S]uppression is not a remedy
for a violation of the Stored Communications Act. The Act has a narrow list of remedies, and—
unlike the Wiretap Act, see 18 U.S.C. § 2515—suppression is not among them.”).
Restatement (First) of Torts § 168 cmt. d, illus. 3 (AM. LAW INST. 1934); see also Restatement (First)
of Torts § 168 (“A conditional or restricted consent to enter land creates a privilege to do so only in
so far as the condition or restriction is complied with.”); see 9 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW
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On the other hand, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that while
property rights rest at the core of the Fourth Amendment, its prohibitions
and permissions do not precisely conform to property law.209 On balance,
when the Government grants a right against itself but not the public at large,
we should respect the limitations on that right. Thus, when the SCA permits
data sharing with the public, prohibits data sharing with the Government,
but declines to apply the exclusionary rule, the Fourth Amendment should
not force the exclusionary rule’s application.
Nonetheless, the Stored Communications Act does broadly prohibit some
content sharing by public providers. Where the exceptions prohibit sharing
data with private parties but permit warrantless sharing with the
Government, these would seem to fall within our unconstitutional conditions
analysis in the previous part.210 Because they grant a broad right to exclude,
the courts should treat that right as a Fourth Amendment property right.
E. Bailment Law
Despite this Article’s title, we have spent surprisingly little time looking
for insight from bailment law. Principally this is because the most important
question to answer was how to identify Fourth Amendment property. But
even after concluding that the Framers would credit modern substantive law
and look for an exclusion right, we detoured leisurely through the exclusion
rights granted by copyright, privacy law, and cybersecurity law before

209

210

ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 492 (1846) (“If A command or request B to take the goods of C, and B
do it, this action lies as well against A as against B.”); 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 51 (1991) (“A
trespass may occur if the party, entering pursuant to a limited consent, i.e., limited as to purpose or
place, proceeds to exceed those limits by divergent conduct on the land of another, as a conditional
or restricted consent to enter land creates a privilege to do so only in so far as the condition or
restriction is complied with.”); Lothar Determann, Internet Freedom and Computer Abuse, 35 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 429, 443–44 (2013) (“[P]roperty owners were always able to some degree to
define limitations on authorizations in a number of different ways, including the following: They
can grant authorization subject to conditions precedent. . . . They can also grant authorization
subject to continued conditions. . . . The property owner can also grant authorization subject to
limitations . . . .”).
See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120–21 (2006) (“[T]he ‘right’ to admit the police to
which Matlock refers is not an enduring and enforceable ownership right as understood by the
private law of property, but is instead the authority recognized by customary social usage as having
a substantial bearing on Fourth Amendment reasonableness in specific circumstances. Thus, to ask
whether the consenting tenant has the right to admit the police when a physically present fellow
tenant objects is not to question whether some property right may be divested by the mere objection
of another. It is, rather, the question whether customary social standing accords the consenting
tenant authority powerful enough to prevail over the co-tenant’s objection.”); United States v.
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974) (“The authority which justifies the third-party consent does
not rest upon the law of property, with its attendant historical and legal refinements . . . .”).
See supra Part III.C.

August 2020]

DIGITAL BAILMENTS

1307

arriving at this Article’s namesake. Admittedly, bailment law is a difficult,
complicated subject. Due to its tendency to incorporate broad principles
from both tort and contract, one scholar has compared bailments to “the
duck-billed, beaver-tailed platypus[, which] incongruously incorporates into
a single species anatomical elements of apparently disparate provenance.”211
Whether due to this difficulty or the sense that bailments treats a fairly
isolated legal area, the subject is famously understudied. In 1992, Professor
R.H. Helmholz noted that the field had garnered no systematic treatise in
sixty years and very few law review articles.212 But though we may merit the
sobriquet for those that rush in, we will at least briefly explore where angels
fear to tread.
Bailment law addresses the obligations owed when a person’s property is
held by another.213 Though we rarely think about it, bailment law touches
our lives on an almost daily basis.214 When I lend my drill to a neighbor,
park my car in a commercial garage, or check my bag on an airline, bailment
law governs the relationship. One early 19th century author called these dayto-day legal relationships “the principal springs and wheels of civil society[,]”
suggesting that without their constant presence, “the whole machine [of
society] would instantly be disordered or broken to pieces”; should they be
destroyed, “the whole [human] species must infallibly be miserable.”215
While the precise standards vary from state to state, bailment law often
imposes three basic duties of care, depending on the bailment relationship.
For bailees that act gratuitously, like the party host that finds a guest’s lost
watch, the law imposes only a duty of slight care.216 For bailment

211
212

213

214

215
216

Eric Alden, Rethinking Promissory Estoppel, 16 NEV. L.J. 659, 689 (2016).
See R.H. Helmholz, Bailment Theories and the Liability of Bailees: The Elusive Uniform Standard of Reasonable
Care, 41 KAN. L. REV. 97, 100 (1992) (“There has been no systematic treatise devoted to the
American law of bailments in more than sixty years. Law review articles devoted to the subject can
be counted on the fingers of two hands. The subject is distinctly out of fashion.”).
See id. at 97 (“[B]ailments are best defined simply as the rightful possession of a chattel by one who
is not also the owner.”); see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS 2
(1832) (“[A] bailment is a delivery of a thing in trust for some special object or purpose, and upon
a contract, express or implied, to conform to the object or purpose of the trust.”).
See WILLIAM JONES, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS 1–2 (1818) (“[T]here is hardly a man
of any age or station, who does not every week and almost every day contract the obligations or
acquire the rights of a hirer or a letter to hire, of a borrower or a lender, of a depository or a person depositing,
of a commissioner or an employer, of a receiver or a giver, in pledge . . . .”).
Id. at 2.
See Morris v. Hamilton, 302 S.E.2d 51, 53 (Va. 1983) (“A bailee who acts gratuitously is not held
to the same standard of care as one who enters upon the same undertaking for pay. The latter owes
a duty of reasonable or ordinary care, while a gratuitous bailee owes only a duty of slight care.
Thus, in order for a bailor to recover from a gratuitous bailee, he must prove the bailee was guilty
of gross negligence.”).

1308

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22:5

relationships where each party benefits, like the commercial garage where I
pay to park, the law imposes a duty of ordinary care.217 Or, as traditionally
expressed, a person should care for another’s goods as he would his own.218
For bailees that benefit alone, like my neighbor borrowing the drill, the law
imposes a duty of extraordinary care.219 Explicit contracts often supplant
these default duties.220 But states may also forbid such contracts where the
relationship overly advantages the bailee; for example, states may forbid the
commercial garage or coat check counter from absolving themselves with
tiny type on the back of a pre-printed card.221
Certain specific actions are always held to violate these duties. For
example, misdelivery—handing property over to someone other than the
owner-directed recipient—is always a breach.222 And the owner’s rights avail
against the world entire. The owner can rightly demand that the third-party
recipient return the property.223 This would seem to hold even against the
Government.224
217
218

219

220

221

222

223

224

See id.
See R.R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357, 383 (1873) (“[I]f ordinary care is due, such as a
prudent man would exercise in his own affairs, failure to bestow that amount of care is called
ordinary negligence.”); JONES, supra note 214, at 6 (“[R]ational men use nearly the same degree of
diligence in the conduct of their own affairs; and this care, therefore, which every person of common
prudence and capable of governing a family takes of his own concerns, is a proper measure of that which
would uniformly be required in performing every contract, if there were not strong reasons for
exacting in some of them a greater, and permitting in others a less, degree of attention.”).
See, e.g., Ferrick Excavating & Grading Co. v. Senger Trucking Co., 484 A.2d 744, 748 (Pa. 1984)
(“When the bailment is for the sole benefit of the bailee, the law requires great diligence on the part
of the bailee, and makes him responsible for slight neglect.”).
See STORY, supra note 213, at 20 (“[P]rinciples [of liability regarding bailments], both in the civil
and in the common law, are to be understood with this limitation, that there is no subsisting contract
between the parties, which varies the general obligation resulting from them; for, if there be such a
contract, that governs the case, unless it be against public policy, or positive law.”).
See Merrill & Smith, supra note 94, at 814–15 (“Bailees who deal in large numbers of standardized
transactions, such as parking lots and coat check rooms, frequently issue receipts or tickets that seek
to define the terms of the bailment agreement. . . . [W]e find evidence of fairly widespread
legislative intervention to regulate limitations on liability on the part of bailees in these situations,
and some evidence of judicial policing through doctrines such as unconscionability.”).
See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 104 (1941) (“A carrier or other
bailee who misdelivers the goods, by an innocent mistake, is a converter. This liability has been
extended even to a so-called ‘involuntary bailee,’ who comes into possession of the chattel by
accident or mistake, and misdelivers it.”).
See Merrill & Smith, supra note 94, at 815 (“The bailor’s relationship with the third party will be
governed by the bailor’s general in rem rights against ‘all the world.’ Pursuant to these rights, the
bailor is of course entitled to demand that the third party return the goods or make good for their
loss.”).
Cf. PHILIP T. VAN ZILE, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS 49–50 (2d ed.
1908) (noting that even though the bailee may be excused if “he ha[s] been deprived of the property by due
process of law and therefore cannot redeliver the property to the bailor,” the bailee’s duty “to protect
the interests of his bailor” remains in cases “where the bailor was not made a party.”).

August 2020]

DIGITAL BAILMENTS

1309

The Supreme Court has regularly considered bailments as property
under the Takings and Due Process clauses, though without referencing that
body of law specifically. For example, in Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation,
the Court held that interest income in IOLTA accounts belonged to the
owner of the principal (though it expressed no opinion on whether the
interest had been “taken” or whether “just compensation” was due).225 And
in Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, the Court held that when a
county clerk managed funds pending a dispute’s judicial resolution, both the
principal and accumulated interest belonged to the creditors; by retaining
the interest, the clerk was taking property without just compensation.226
One enormous wrinkle affects whether bailment law governs digital
assets. Bailment law presupposes that the owner in fact owns the property
and that it will be returned to the owner or handled according to the owner’s
wishes.227 While this might apply to some digital data, like files stored with a
cloud provider, vast amounts of collected data are either not the originator’s
property or they have no expectation the data will be returned.
IV. PAPERS UNDER ANOTHER GUISE?
Before addressing the individual places where digital documents can
reside—like cloud hosting, e-mail services, other messaging providers, and
metadata—we should first address one definitional piece that applies broadly
across all these categories: Are these digital documents the “papers”
envisioned by the Fourth Amendment? On this point, Founding sentiment,
courts, and scholars all agree: Yes, digital documents are indeed the same
papers, even if they use new and unfamiliar ink.
Obviously, the Founding generation did not anticipate our connected
world, with messages converted to digital signals and pulsed across the globe
in fractions of a second. But then as now, messages mirror the mind. And
the Framers held the same unequivocal sentiment: The mind must remain
sacrosanct.
England’s experience in cases like Wilkes and Entick forged the Framers’
antipathy toward general warrants as a rule, and document searches
225
226
227

See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998) (holding “that the interest income
generated by funds held in IOLTA accounts is the ‘private property’ of the owner of the principal”).
Webb’s Fabulous Pharms., Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164–65 (1980).
See, e.g., Lynch Props., Inc. v. Potomac Ins. Co., 140 F.3d 622, 627 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Under Texas
law, the elements of a bailment are: (1) delivery of personal property by one person to another to
be used for a specific purpose; (2) acceptance of such delivery; and (3) an express or implied contract
that the purpose will be carried out and the property will then be returned or dealt with as otherwise
directed.”).

1310

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22:5

particularly. In Wilkes v. Wood, Chief Justice Pratt held that seizing Wilkes’
papers was an unforgivable offense: “[O]f all offences . . . a seizure of papers
was the least capable of reparation; . . . for other offences, an
acknowledgment might make amends, but . . . for the promulgation of our
most private concerns, affairs of the most secret personal nature, no
reparation whatsoever could be made.”228 Entick’s counsel went further,
calling document searches a torture of the mind, every bit as condemnable
as torture of the body: “[R]ansacking a man’s secret drawers and boxes, to
come at evidence against him, is like racking his body to come at his secret
thoughts.”229 In holding for Entick, Chief Justice Camden did not stretch
quite that far, but nonetheless showed profound offense at “rifl[ing]” a man’s
house and removing “his most valuable secrets.”230 The Court held that the
Crown’s claimed power to search was “not supported by one single citation
from any law book extant.”231 Similarly, the House of Commons recognized
the particular sensitivity of documents: “[P]apers, though often dearer to a
man than his heart’s blood, and equally close, have neither eyes nor ears to
perceive the injury done to them, nor tongue to complain of it, and of course,
may be treated to a degree highly injurious to the owners . . . .”232
This antipathy toward document searches translated easily across the
Atlantic. As Revolutionary author The Father of Candor wrote, papers that
the Government seizes “are immediately to be thrown into the hands of some
clerks, of much curiosity . . . who will . . . naturally amuse themselves with
the perusal of all private letters, memorandums, secrets and intrigues, of the
gentleman himself, and of all his friends and acquaintances of both sexes.”233
Even specific warrants proved problematic, because “in that case, all a man’s
papers must be indiscriminately examined, and such examination may bring
things to light which it may not concern the public to know, and which yet it
may prove highly detrimental to the owner to have made public.”234
This idea that documents extend the inviolable mind into the physical
world traditionally reached beyond the Fourth Amendment, linking it with

228
229
230
231
232
233
234

Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.) 490.
Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1038 (1765).
Id. at 1064.
Id.
16 THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR
1803, at 10 (1813).
THE FATHER OF CANDOR, supra note 21, at 54–55.
Herbert Broom & George L. Denman, Constitutional Law Viewed in Relation to Common Law
608 (1885).
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Fifth Amendment concerns.235 In resisting a subpoena to produce files about
its Vice Chancellor, Oxford University argued that forcing the university to
turn over incriminating documents would “tempt a man to make shipwreck
of his conscience, in order to disculpate himself.”236 Chief Justice Lee agreed,
concluding that the Crown could not compel self-incrimination.237
As Professor Laura Donohue points out, this profound respect for private
thoughts prevented document searches for nearly two hundred years.238
Thus we drew a substantial buffer around freedom of thought, which Justice
Cardozo called “the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every
other form of freedom.”239
If the Fourth Amendment protects written thoughts, then their precise
form proves immaterial. Whether papyrus, vellum, or magnetic platters, all
are protected papers.240

235

236
237

238

239
240

See Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 808 (2005) (“Throughout
the nineteenth century, courts looked to the Fifth Amendment, not the Fourth Amendment, in
analyzing the validity of subpoenas, and most believed that the Fifth Amendment’s injunction
against compelling a person to testify against himself prohibited the government from demanding
incriminating documents from a suspect. Late in the nineteenth century the Supreme Court
expanded on this notion, by holding that such compulsion violated the Fifth Amendment and the
Fourth Amendment’s restriction on unreasonable searches and seizures.”).
Donohue, supra note 21, at 1309 (quoting The King v. Dr. Purnell, 96 Eng. Rep. 20 (KB 1748)).
See id. Modern Court precedent has decoupled the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. See Slobogin,
supra note 235 (“At the turn of the twentieth century, however, the Court reversed itself, removing
virtually all Fourth Amendment strictures on document subpoenas and, when the documents were
corporate in nature, eliminating Fifth Amendment limitations as well.”). This seems neither wise
nor historically accurate.
Laura K. Donohue, The Fourth Amendment in a Digital World, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 553, 568
(2017) (“For nearly two hundred years, the government could not obtain private papers—even with
a warrant—when they were to be used as evidence of criminal activity.”).
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969).
Admittedly, this conclusion glibly oversimplifies the matter. In this author’s view, all are protected
papers, but defining “search” has proven difficult, given the differences between physical and
electronic papers. For example, if a police officer copied paper files by hand, obviously the officer
searched them. But to maintain the computer’s evidentiary integrity, police commonly make a
perfect digital copy for any seized drives. Normally no person views the data when the copy gets
made. Has a search occurred? Multiple authors have weighed in on difficult questions like these.
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Entick v Carrington and Boyd v United States: Keeping the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments on Track, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 27, 48–49 (2015) (using an approach based on
acquiring “new information”); see also Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 531, 547–48 (2005) (advocating an approach that finds a search where data “is exposed to
human observation”). This article focuses solely on defining Fourth Amendment digital property,
without drawing boundary lines for searches.
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V. FOURTH AMENDMENT PROPERTY RIGHTS IN DIGITAL DOCUMENTS
A. Cloud Files
More and more people utilize cloud services like Dropbox, Google Docs,
and Microsoft OneDrive to store their files.241 The benefits are obvious:
ubiquitous access to your data from every device you own.242 You can even
control whether folders hold local copies or need to reach out to the cloud
every time you access them.243 If you keep local copies, your data updates
when you connect and remains ready on your device when you disconnect.244
For Fourth Amendment purposes, are these cloud files our property? Do
we have the right to exclude others from them? Indeed. The Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act bars unauthorized individuals from accessing our files
and sharing them with others.245 The Stored Communications Act generally
prevents even our storage provider from doing the same.246 And bailment
law should treat digital storage providers no different than physical storage
providers. Without a warrant, the Fourth Amendment should bar
Government from delving through them.
B. E-Mails
E-mail was arguably the Internet’s entire purpose. When the network
started as ARPANET, linking government facilities and major research

241

242
243

244

245
246

See, e.g., Kevin Curran, Can Dropbox Keep Its Paid User Growth Momentum Going?, REAL MONEY (Aug.
10, 2018, 4:37 PM), https://realmoney.thestreet.com/articles/08/10/2018/can-dropbox-keepits-paid-user-growth-momentum-going (“Dropbox Inc.’s (DBX) paid users grew to 11.9 million in
the second quarter, up 400,000 from the prior quarter and 1 million from the prior year quarter.”).
See, e.g., Easy File Syncing, DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com/features/sync (“Save a file to the
Dropbox folder on your computer, and it will sync automatically to your mobile device.”).
See Smart Sync, DROPBOX, https://help.dropbox.com/installs-integrations/sync-uploads/smartsync (“Smart Sync is a Dropbox feature that helps you save space on your hard drive. . . . With
Smart Sync, content on your computer is available as either online-only, local, or in mixed state
folders.”).
See Easy File Syncing, supra note 242(“With the desktop app, locally synchronized folders and files are
available even when you’re away from an internet connection. Once you get back online, Dropbox
will automatically synchronize your folders and files with all the latest changes. You can also select
files to access offline on your Android or iPhone smartphone, and even your iPad.”).
See supra Part III.C (discussing the use of The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act as a tool for
combating cybercrime).
See supra Part III.D (summarizing The Stored Communications Act’s general prohibitions).
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institutions, it sought constant, unbreakable communication.247 And simple
electronic messaging—e-mail—leveraged that connectivity.
Surprisingly, the way e-mail works remains mostly unchanged. Then and
now, e-mail works with two servers, the sender and the receiver. Users access
a server, write their e-mail, and then instruct the server to send it to
USERNAME@DOMAIN. Their server looks up the domain and hands the
e-mail to the server in charge of that domain. Then the sending server keeps
a copy in that user’s outbox. The receiving server looks up the recipient in
its user database and puts the e-mail in that user’s inbox. When the user
opens the e-mail, the server marks it as having been read.
Certain details around this core design have changed as we change the
way we use the technology. For example, as more people acquired home
PCs, they no longer logged directly into servers to send and receive e-mail.
Instead, they composed e-mails on their home computer, often without
connecting to the Internet.248 When they were ready to send a batch of emails, their computer could dial their Internet provider.249 Their mail client
would hand whole e-mail batches to the sending server.250 The e-mails
would go from sending server to receiving server, then get sorted into the
recipient’s inbox.251 But just like on the sending end, few recipients are
logging directly on to their server. Instead, their e-mail program would
247

248

249
250

251

Every major source agrees on this. But the sources disagree on exactly what they feared would break
the system. Government sources suggest that ARPANET was insurance against nuclear war.
See, e.g., Stephen J. Lukasik, Why the Arpanet Was Built, 33 IEEE ANNALS OF THE HISTORY OF
COMPUTING 4, 4 (2011) (“Writing from the viewpoint of the person who signed most of the checks
for Arpanet’s development, . . . [t]he goal was to exploit new computer technologies to meet the
needs of military command and control against nuclear threats, achieve survivable control of US
nuclear forces, and improve military tactical and management decision making.”). Other sources
suggest that they wanted persistent access to research computers across the country despite network
changes or outages. See, e.g., Mary Bellis, ARPAnet – The First Internet, ABOUT: INVENTORS OF THE
MODERN COMPUTER, http://theinventors.org/library/weekly/aa091598.htm (“[Former ARPA
director Charles Herzfeld] claimed that ARPAnet was not created as a result of a military need,
stating ‘it came out of our frustration that there were only a limited number of large, powerful
research computers in the country and that many research investigators who should have access
were geographically separated from them.’”).
See, e.g., Juno Online Services, WIKIPEDIA (May 17, 2020, 7:34 PM),
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Juno_Online_Services&oldid=957234167
(“The
user could write emails with the Juno client and would periodically sign in by dial-up. Upon doing
so, the Juno client would upload any emails the user had written . . . .”).
See id.
See, e.g., Simple Mail Transfer Protocol, WIKIPEDIA (May 11, 2020, 11:44 AM),
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Simple_Mail_Transfer_Protocol&oldid=956078379
(“Email is submitted by a mail client (mail user agent, MUA) to a mail server (mail submission
agent, MSA) using SMTP on TCP port 587.”).
See id. (“Once the final hop accepts the incoming message, it hands it to a mail delivery agent (MDA)
for local delivery. An MDA saves messages in the relevant mailbox format.”).
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periodically dial in, check for new mail, and download the mail to their local
PC.252 The program would then either delete all the mail on the server or
mark it as read.253
But this client-server model has declined with webmail like Hotmail and
Gmail, where we are effectively logging on to the servers themselves again.254
With the substantial free storage space offered by these providers,255 they
often become vast e-mail archives spanning years and even decades. And
with virtually every online system from hotels to retailers to transportation
sending e-receipts, e-mail becomes an enormous information trove, even
without accounting for all the poorly considered private messages sent and
received.
E-mails are among the few third-party digital documents that the courts
have held protected under Katz. In its pathbreaking decision United States v.
Warshak, the Sixth Circuit explained that the defendant “plainly manifested
a [subjective] expectation that his e-mails would be shielded from outside
scrutiny . . . [g]iven the often sensitive and sometimes damning substance of
his e-mails.”256 On the objective side, Warshak concluded that society
considered e-mails at least as private as letters and phone calls, both
protected under prior Fourth Amendment precedent.257 Confronting the
252

253

254

255

256
257

See id. (“Mail is retrieved by end-user applications, called email clients, using Internet Message
Access Protocol (IMAP), a protocol that both facilitates access to mail and manages stored mail, or
the Post Office Protocol (POP) . . . .”); Post Office Protocol, WIKIPEDIA (MAY 9,
2020, 11:24 PM), https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Post_Office_Protocol&oldid=955
81360 (“Th[e] design of POP and its procedures was driven by the need of users having only
temporary Internet connections, such as dial-up access, allowing these users to retrieve e-mail when
connected, and subsequently to view and manipulate the retrieved messages when offline.”).
See Email Client, WIKIPEDIA (May 24, 2020, 5:24 PM),
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Email_client&oldid=958593657 (“The Post Office
Protocol (POP) allows the user to download messages one at a time and only deletes them from the
server after they have been successfully saved on local storage. . . . However, there is no provision
for flagging a specific message as seen, answered, or forwarded, thus POP is not convenient for
users who access the same mail from different machines. Alternatively, the Internet Message Access
Protocol (IMAP) allows users to keep messages on the server, flagging them as appropriate.”).
This comes with the substantial caveat that mobile devices—designed to operate with many
different servers—still send and retrieve e-mail with SMTP and IMAP/POP. See, e.g., Setting Up
POP/IMAP Email on an Android (Jellybean), NO-IP:
KNOWLEDGE BASE,
https://www.noip.com/support/knowledgebase/setting-up-popimap-email-on-an-android-jelly
bean/ (providing readers with set-up instructions).
See, e.g., Chris Hoffman, How to Free Up Storage Space on Your Google Account: The Ultimate Guide, HOWTO GEEK (July 12, 2017, 1:24 PM), https://www.howtogeek.com/171788/how-to-free-upstorage-space-on-your-google-account-the-ultimate-guide/ (“Every [Google] account gets 15GB of
free space . . . .]”).
United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 284 (6th Cir. 2010).
See id. at 284–86 (discussing protections for phone calls and letters and concluding that “[g]iven the
fundamental similarities between email and traditional forms of communication, it would defy
common sense to afford emails lesser Fourth Amendment protection”).
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third-party issue, Warshak held that while some agreements between e-mail
providers and subscribers might extinguish a reasonable expectation of
privacy, only clear contractual language would suffice.258 After all, routine
incursions by maids and handymen do not render hotel rooms and
apartments unprotected.259 Warshak recognized that its holding created
tension with Miller. But it concluded that Miller could be limited to the
business records at issue, which were both simpler and necessary for bank
business.260 Though the Supreme Court has never taken up the issue, when
Carpenter refused to extend the third-party doctrine to cell-site location data,
the Court suggested that “the third-party doctrine does not apply to the
‘modern-day equivalents of an individual’s own ‘papers’ or ‘effects,’” and
they should receive “full Fourth Amendment protection.”261
For Fourth Amendment purposes, are these e-mails our property? Do
we have the right to exclude others from them? Absolutely. The Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act bars unauthorized individuals from accessing our email and sharing it with others.262 The Stored Communications Act
generally prevents even our e-mail service provider from doing the same.263
And bailment law expects that vendors holding our property temporarily will
exclude others from it. E-mail should remain as protected under a property
theory as Warshak has protected it under a privacy theory.
C. Other Messaging Services—Snapchat, Telegram, Etc.
E-mail remains one of the few messaging services that operates across
servers owned by unrelated entities. As discussed above, e-mail protocols like
258
259

260
261

262
263

See id. at 287 (“[W]e are unwilling to hold that a subscriber agreement will never be broad enough
to snuff out a reasonable expectation of privacy.”).
See id. (internal citations omitted) (“Hotel guests . . . have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their rooms . . . even though maids routinely enter hotel rooms . . . . Similarly, tenants have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in their apartments . . . regardless of the incursions of handymen
. . . .”).
See id. at 288 (limiting certain cases to business records at issue rather than an unlimited amount of
confidential communications).
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2222 (2018) (quoting Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2230
(Kennedy, J., dissenting)). The Court is speaking hypothetically here—“[i]f the third-party doctrine
does not apply to the ‘modern-day equivalents of an individual’s own ‘papers’ or ‘effects,’’ then the
clear implication is that the documents should receive full Fourth Amendment protection”—
because the majority is fencing with Justices Kennedy’s and Alito’s dissents. Id. But the majority
next suggests that modern-day “papers” like e-mails and cell-site location information should both
receive protection: “We simply think that such protection should extend as well to a detailed log of
a person’s movements over several years.” Id.
See supra Part III.C (discussing the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act being used as a statutory tool
for combating cybercrime).
See supra Part III.D (detailing The Stored Communications Act’s general prohibitions).
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SMTP, POP, and IMAP are all open standards, which let e-mail traverse
networks and servers owned by many different companies and individuals.
By contrast, systems like Snapchat, Telegram, Slack, and Facebook
Messenger are closed protocols. When you send a message on these services,
it never leaves Snapchat, Telegram, Slack, or Facebook.
But the same legal principles apply. The messages are still messages. The
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act bars unauthorized individuals from
accessing our messages and sharing them with others.264 The Stored
Communications Act generally prevents even the service provider from
doing the same.265 And bailment law expects that property will get delivered
to the correct recipient. These messages should remain similarly protected.
D. Metadata
Metadata is “data about data.”266 In the Fourth Amendment context, it
refers to the non-content information that surrounds our online activities and
communications.267 The precise line between content and non-content
information remains fuzzy and shifts with the context.268 Modern online life
generates endless metadata. And it can be shockingly intrusive. Indeed, the
cell-site location information at issue in Carpenter was almost certainly
metadata, rather than content information. As the Court pointed out, this
data could provide enormous insight into a subject’s private life: “[A] cell
phone—almost ‘a feature of human anatomy,’—tracks nearly exactly the

264
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267

268

See supra Part III.C (discussing the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act being used as a statutory tool
for combating cybercrime).
See supra Part III.D (explaining the Stored Communications Act’s general preventions of service
provider actions).
Piotr Kononow, What Is Metadata (With Examples), DATAEDO (Sept. 16, 2018),
https://dataedo.com/kb/data-glossary/what-is-metadata.
See, e.g., ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 793 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Unlike what is gleaned from the
more traditional investigative practice of wiretapping, telephone metadata do not include the voice
content of telephone conversations. Rather, they include details about telephone calls, including,
for example, the length of a call, the phone number from which the call was made, and the phone
number called.”); see also KERR, supra note 203, at 624 (“Contents of communications are the
substance of the message communicated from sender to receiver, while non-content information
refers to the information used to deliver the communications from senders to receivers and other
network-generated information about the communication. In the case of a telephone call, for
example, a basic difference exists between the contents of the call (the communication) and mere
information about the call (such as the phone numbers of the two parties and the duration of the
call.”).
See In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 137 (3d Cir. 2015)
(“[T]here is no general answer to the question of whether locational information is content. Rather,
a ‘content’ inquiry is a case-specific one turning on the role the location identifier played in the
‘intercepted’ communication.”).
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movements of its owner. . . . A cell phone faithfully follows its owner beyond
public thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor’s offices, political
headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales.”269 Metadata can
prove every bit as intrusive as content information; indeed, sometimes it
proves more so.
But the statutory schemes we use to find property rights for content
information find little purchase here. The CFAA remains applicable, but it
is not clear whether we have sufficient ownership to claim the data. And the
CFAA does not prohibit sharing by the service provider in any event. The
Stored Communications Act broadly permits providing non-content
information “to any person other than a governmental entity.”270 As
discussed in this Article’s section on the SCA, an argument certainly exists
for triggering constitutional protections based on the SCA’s prohibition on
government data sharing.271 But that conclusion seems by no means certain.
Like the CFAA, bailment law bears only questionable relevance, with
metadata’s ownership in question. And even if the originator owned the
metadata, they had no expectation it would be returned or delivered
according to their instructions.
CONCLUSION
Professor Jed Rubenfeld rightly summarized the problems with a privacyfocused Fourth Amendment:
[A] Fourth Amendment dedicated to privacy must . . . ultimately reduce
itself to duplicating private-sphere privacy expectations.
There is nothing wrong with a Fourth Amendment so conceived, except
that it will have no understanding of what it really stands for. It will see its
role inevitably shrinking as information technology expands. So long as
Fourth Amendment privacy is parasitical on private-sphere privacy, the
former must die as its host dies, and this host is undoubtedly faltering today
in the networked, monitored and digitized world we are learning to call our
own.272

Narrowly focused and unable to keep pace with technology’s breakneck
development, the Katz standard cannot protect us in a digital world. Property
offers more certainty. And with that certainty comes—hopefully—quicker
and more definitive judicial responses to the Government’s overreach.
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Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018) (citations omitted).
18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(6) (2012).
See supra Part III.D (discussing the Stored Communication Act’s prohibition of some content).
Rubenfeld, supra note 14, at 118.

1318

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22:5

